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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks consist of a large amount of sensor nodes, small
low-cost wireless computing devices equipped with different sensors. Sensor
networks collect and process environmental data and can be used for habi-
tat monitoring, precision agriculture, wildfire detection, structural health
monitoring and many other applications.
Securing sensor networks calls for novel solutions, especially because of
their unattended deployment and strong resource limitations. Moreover, de-
veloping security solutions without knowing precisely against what threats
the system should be protected is impossible. Thus, the first task in securing
sensor networks is to define a realistic adversary model. We systematically
investigate vulnerabilities in sensor networks, specifically focusing on phys-
ical attacks on sensor node hardware. These are all attacks that require
direct physical access to the sensor nodes. Most severe attacks of this kind
are also known as node capture, or node compromise. Based on the vul-
nerability analysis, we present a novel general adversary model for sensor
networks.
If the data collected within a sensor network is valuable or should be kept
confidential then the data should be protected from unauthorized access. We
determine security issues in the context of access control in sensor networks
in presence of node capture attacks and develop protocols for broadcast
authentication that constitute the core of our solutions for access control.
We develop broadcast authentication protocols for the case where the
adversary can capture up to some threshold t sensor nodes. The developed
protocols offer absolute protection while not more than t nodes are captured,
but their security breaks completely otherwise. Moreover, security in this
case comes at a high cost, as the resource requirements for the protocols
grow rapidly with t.
One of the most popular ways to overcome impossibility or inefficiency of
solutions in distributed systems is to make the protocol goals probabilistic.
We therefore develop efficient probabilistic protocols for broadcast authen-
tication. Security of these protocols degrades gracefully with the increasing
number of captured nodes. We conclude that the perfect threshold secu-
rity is less appropriate for sensor networks than the probabilistic approach.
Gracefully degrading security offers better scalability and saves resources,
and should be considered as a promising security paradigm for sensor net-
works.
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vZusammenfassung
Drahtlose Sensornetze messen und verarbeiten Umgebungsparameter wie
z.B. Temperatur, Helligkeit oder Luftdruck. Die erhobenen Daten ko¨nnen
in verschiedenen Anwendungen benutzt werden, z.B. zur Beobachtung von
wilden Tieren in ihrem natu¨rlichen Lebensraum, zur Fru¨herkennung von
Waldbra¨nden oder zur Geba¨udeu¨berwachung.
Sicherheitsanforderungen an Sensornetze sind schwer zu erfu¨llen, ins-
besondere weil die Sensornetze unbeaufsichtigt funktionieren sollen, und
die Sensorknoten sehr ressourcenbeschra¨nkt sind. Außerdem gibt es keine
bewa¨hrten Angreifermodelle fu¨r Sensornetze, da entsprechende Erfahrungen
mit Anwendungen in der Praxis bisher fehlen. Folglich war das erste Ziel
dieser Arbeit, realita¨tsnahe Angreifermodelle fu¨r Sensornetze zu definieren.
Zu diesem Zweck wurden systematisch Angriffe auf Sensorknoten unter-
sucht. Anhand der gewonnenen Erkentnisse wurde daraufhin ein neues, er-
weiterebares Rahmenwerk fu¨r Angreifermodelle in Sensornetzen entwickelt.
Ein weiteres wichtiges Thema in Sensornetzen ist Zugriffskontrolle, denn
die gesammelten Daten sind oft wertvoll oder sensibel. Insbesondere schwierig
gestaltet sich die Absicherung von Sensornetzen falls der Angreifer in der
Lage ist, einige Sensorknoten vollsta¨ndig unter seine Kontrolle zu bringen.
In dieser Arbeit wurden zuerst Protokolle fu¨r Zugriffskontrolle entwick-
elt, die sicher gegen einen Angreifer sind, der eine bestimmte Anzahl t
von Sensorknoten u¨bernimmt. Diese Protokolle leisten sehr hohe Sicher-
heit solange nicht mehr als t Knoten u¨bernommen wurden, versagen aber
komplett, falls der Angreifer mehr als t Knoten in seine Gewalt bringt. Lei-
der verbrauchen diese Protokolle fu¨r eine realistische Anzahl u¨bernommener
Knoten (z.B., mehr als 10 Knoten) sehr viele Ressourcen und sind demnach
nicht optimal fu¨r batteriebetriebene Sensornetze.
Randomisierung ist eine bekannte Methode zur Verbesserung der Ef-
fizienz von verteilten Algorithmen. Aus diesem Grund wurden ferner in
dieser Arbeit probabilistische Protokolle zur Zugriffskontrolle in Sensornet-
zen entwickelt. Diese Protokolle sind tatsa¨chlich viel effizienter als die oben
genannten deterministischen Verfahren. Außerdem sind die entwickelten
probabilistischen Protokolle graduell abstufbar, d.h. sie bieten hohe Sicher-
heit falls wenige Knoten u¨bernommen wurden und bieten immer niederigere
Sicherheit mit steigender Anzahl von kompromittierten Knoten. Graduell
abstufbare Sicherheit hat in Sensornetzen einen großen Vorteil, da es sehr
schwierig ist, eine genaue Grenze fu¨r die Anzahl der u¨bernommenen Knoten
zu definieren.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of a large number of sensor nodes
which are small low-cost, low-performance, battery-powered wireless com-
puting devices equipped with various sensors. The sensor nodes jointly
collect and store environmental data such as temperature, humidity, light
conditions, seismic activities, images of the environment. This data can be
used to detect certain events and to trigger activities in such applications as
habitat monitoring [119], wildfire detection [52], precision agriculture [34],
structural health monitoring [148], military perimeter protection [8], med-
ical emergency response [99] and many others. Comprehensive overviews
on WSN applications can be found in Zhao and Guibas [154], Karl and
Willig [83].
In principle, a sensor network can be regarded as a large and massively
distributed database that continuously acquires and stores new data and
makes it accessible to users in some meaningful way. For example, a user
might wish to know in which areas covered by the sensor network the tem-
perature is above some threshold values of θ degrees.
This thesis considers the problem of protecting sensor network data from
illegitimate access. In the following, we explain why this data needs pro-
tection in the first place (Section 1.1.1), why the traditional security mech-
anisms cannot be used in sensor networks (Section 1.1.2), and finally, why
determining against which attacks the data should be protected is in itself
a new challenge in sensor networks (Section 1.1.3).
1
2 1 Introduction
1.1.1 The Need for Access Control
If the data collected within a sensor network is valuable or should be kept
confidential, then security measures should protect the access to this data.
There are two main reasons why this is necessary.
The first reason is concerned with the value of data. With the increasing
ubiquity of WSNs, environmental data will be available on demand almost
everywhere in our environment from a surrounding WSN. Of course, ac-
cessing this data will in general not be for free since deployment of WSNs
induces some costs. This means that the deployment agencies of these ser-
vices will make them available only to certain people, usually people who
pay for receiving the service. In this case, a WSN must be able to distinguish
legitimate users from illegitimate ones. The incentives to gain illegitimate
access to these valuable data can be expected to be quite high.
Moreover, if the sensor network data is used for gaining critical informa-
tion, such as intrusion detection for building or area security, the injection
of false data into the network (for example, in order to mask an intrusion)
becomes a likely event.
The second reason concerns the sensitivity of data. For example, if the
sensor network is used to monitor a building, then the temperature and
humidity data from different rooms would allow the burglars to infer the
presence of humans in the different parts of the building.
1.1.2 The Need for Novel Security Solutions
Securing sensor networks is a difficult problem due to a number of rea-
sons [117, 126]. The extreme resource scarceness of the sensor nodes, the
large network size, and the possibility of node capture attacks are usually
mentioned as the most severe difficulties.
A typical sensor node contains an 8 to 16 bit microcontroller, with the
amount of RAM varying between 2 kB and 10 kB and flash instruction mem-
ory ranging from 48 kB to 128 kB. The speed of radio communications is in
the order of 100 kbit/s. The sensor networks are supposed to operate for
months and even years using a few small (e.g., AA) batteries. This can only
be possible if all algorithms running on the sensor nodes are designed with
energy saving in mind.
This means that computation-intensive tasks that are typical for public-
key cryptography are very expensive in terms of energy, memory and time
consumption, and should be used sparingly, if at all. This is unfortunate
since public-key cryptography is the main instrument to achieve access con-
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trol in traditional networks.
For example, the most efficient so far implementation of elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) on sensor nodes [70] still needs 0.5 seconds for the basic
ECC operation of point multiplication. For comparison, basic symmetric-
key operations can be performed in a fraction of a millisecond [84].
Additionally, especially the radio consumes a lot of energy. Sending one
bit can be as expensive as executing 1000 instructions [74]. A sensor node
which operates with its radio always on (for example, waiting for messages),
may exhaust its battery after only one week, even if it does not compute
anything. Thus, security measures in sensor networks should not demand
much communication.
Restricted communication puts constraints on the use of symmetric-key
cryptography in large sensor networks. Although symmetric-key algorithms
are lightweight enough to run on sensor nodes, the management of shared
keys in a large network requires much communication.
Furthermore, management of shared keys becomes especially difficult in
presence of node capture attacks. Node capture means gaining full control
over a sensor node through a physical attack, e.g., by opening the node’s
cover and reading out its memory and changing its program. This attack
is very likely to go unnoticed in a large sensor network where the physical
access to the nodes is not restricted. Thus, security solutions for sensor
networks should be resilient to node capture and therefore cannot completely
rely on secrets which are stored inside single nodes.
The above features of sensor networks make traditional methods for
achieving security in general, and access control in particular, inapplicable
and call for novel security paradigms and solutions.
1.1.3 The Need for Realistic Adversary Models
When designing a secure system, a fundamental question should be answered
first: what should be protected against which threats? The question of how
to protect cannot be answered otherwise.
The adversaries in sensor networks differ from the adversaries in tradi-
tional computer security with respect to the amount of physical access they
can get to the nodes. In traditional computer security the adversary has
only remote access to the nodes. In ad hoc networks, although the adver-
sary may gain physical access to a restricted number of devices (e.g., by
stealing them), most of the devices are supposed to be under the control of
legitimate users.
In sensor networks, on the other hand, direct physical access to arbitrary
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nodes may become possible, if the network operates unattended. This means
that the adversary models used in traditional computer security do not fit
the realities of sensor networks.
Numerous papers on different aspects of security in sensor networks have
been published in the last 10 years. However, most of these papers have been
astonishingly lax about the description of their adversaries. Although the
adversary is usually mentioned and some of its properties are described, the
descriptions are often ambiguous, such that comparison of different security
solutions with the goal of choosing the most appropriate one becomes very
difficult.
This may be due to the fact that the problem of security in sensor net-
works is relatively new, and the possible attacks are not well understood.
Moreover, only very few real-world deployments are known so far, and to our
knowledge, none of them has ever been attacked. On the other hand, adver-
sary types in traditional security are very well known, not at least because
of numerous real attacks on real computer systems. Moreover, traditional
security has been developing for many decades, giving the researches many
opportunities to define and refine adversary models. Thus, before designing
security solutions for sensor networks, possible attacks should be analyzed
and classified.
For example, how realistic are the above mentioned node capture at-
tacks? Which resources do they require? Most current security mechanisms
for WSNs take node capture into account. It is usually assumed that node
capture is “easy”. Thus, some security mechanisms are verified with re-
spect to being able to resist capture of 100 and more sensor nodes out of
10,000 [37, 79]. However, to the best of our knowledge, nobody ever tried
to determine the actual cost and effort needed to attack currently available
sensor nodes.
1.2 Contributions
1.2.1 Real-World Physical Attacks on Sensor Networks
Many sensor network applications demand that the sensor nodes be placed
in unattended environments, such as forests, fields, large buildings, where an
attacker has the opportunity to gain physical access to several nodes. This
type of physical attacks distinguish sensor networks from all other types of
networks, where the nodes are usually associated with some human (the
user, or the network operator) who takes care of restricting the access to the
device.
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This thesis presents, to our knowledge, the first systematical study of
physical attacks on sensor nodes. We developed a design space for physical
attacks, experimentally determined the effort needed for various kinds of
attacks and proposed possible countermeasures. This systematical investi-
gation also proved very valuable for developing and refining the adversary
models for sensor networks.
1.2.2 Adversary Models for Sensor Networks
Is it possible to define realistic adversary models for sensor networks, consid-
ering the young age of the field and the absence of attacks on real systems?
This thesis provides a set of generic adversary models for sensor networks.
Our flexible and extendable framework comprises a broad range of possible
adversaries which are structured into several orthogonal dimensions. Using
our approach, the system designers can select the most appropriate adver-
sary models for their sensor networks. The adversaries are placed into a
partially ordered lattice. This is especially useful as the partial order gives
insights into what can happen in case the adversary is stronger (or weaker)
than the anticipated one.
Our adversary model is to our knowledge the first attempt to system-
atically investigate possible adversaries in sensor networks. It can be easily
extended to new classes of adversaries, and makes security solutions for
sensor networks comparable to each other.
1.2.3 Access Control to Sensor Network Data
Resource constraints and new types of attacks in sensor networks make se-
curity in this domain particularly challenging. As is well known in the world
of fault-tolerant computing and service replication, withstanding capture of
even a small amount of nodes in a network requires a severe amount of
computation and communication [73,121].
In this thesis, we consider the problem of access control in presence of
node capture attacks. Firstly, we develop a general model for access control
to the data in sensor networks. According to our model, access control
comprises two subproblems: user access control and authenticated querying.
We then consider solutions to these problems in the face of node capture
attacks.
In particular, authenticated querying is a variant of a very prominent
security problem called broadcast authentication. Numerous solutions to
broadcast authentication in sensor networks have emerged in the last years.
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Luk et al. [100] identify the most desirable properties for broadcast authen-
tication in sensor networks. None of currently published protocols provide
all these properties. In search of solutions to authenticated querying, we
come up with two novel broadcast authentication protocols.
We firstly investigate the concept of sensor networks which are able to
withstand capture of at most t sensor nodes. We call such networks t-
robust. We consider security primitives for t-robust networks and develop
corresponding protocols, especially a t-robust broadcast authentication pro-
tocol. The developed protocol is secure an efficient for small values of t.
On the other hand, we show that the resource requirements for t-robust
sensor networks grow very fast with t, such that values of t > 10 are pro-
hibitive. Moreover, according to the design goal, t-robust protocols provide
secure solutions only as long as no more than t nodes are captured, and
break completely in case of the capture of t + 1 nodes. This feature is un-
desirable, as it is difficult to determine the appropriate t. If the adversary
was able to capture t = 5 nodes, the effort of capturing a sixth node seems
to be marginal.
In the face of these difficulties, the concept of gracefully degrading and
probabilistic security seems to be more appropriate for sensor networks. This
concept means that the security properties of the protocol are satisfied with
certain large probability and degrade with the number of captured nodes.
Although probabilistic security has been previously considered in sen-
sor networks for key management [37, 55] and for data delivery [151], our
authenticated query flooding (AQF) protocol is the first one to provide prob-
abilistic, gracefully degrading security for access control in sensor networks.
AQF is the first protocol to provide all desirable broadcast authentication
properties.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss
security goals in sensor networks, and present our experiments with physical
attacks on sensor nodes. Based on this experience, we then present a flexible
and extendable generic adversary model, and discuss possible protection
mechanisms for different adversary classes.
In Chapter 3 we consider the problem of access control to sensor net-
work data, subdivide it into two subproblems: user access control and au-
thenticated querying, and discuss the design space for possible solutions in
presence of different adversary classes.
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Chapter 5 considers the concept of t-robust sensor networks. We develop
and analyze protocols for t-robust access control, and especially for t-robust
authenticated querying.
In Chapter 6 we develop a solution for probabilistic authenticated query-
ing. The security of this solution degrades gracefully with the number of
captured nodes. We conclude that gracefully degrading probabilistic secu-
rity is more appropriate for sensor networks than t-robustness.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes this thesis and gives directions for future
work.
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Chapter 2
Security Threats and
Adversary Models
2.1 Introduction
The following quotation by Gligor [65] gives probably the best (and shortest)
motivation for the work presented in this chapter: A system without an
adversary definition cannot be insecure. It can only be astonishing.
This statement emphasizes the impossibility of designing a secure system
without answering a fundamental question first: what should be protected
against which threats?
Considering the Internet as an example, it is extremely difficult to add
security to systems which were originally designed without security in mind.
The goal of security is to “protect right things in a right way” [3]. Thus,
careful analysis is needed concerning which things to protect against which
threats and how to protect them. Of course, this analysis is only possible
in context of a particular class of applications. However, it makes much
sense to provide a set of abstract security requirements and a set of generic
attacker models, i.e., a framework for security analysis in wireless sensor
networks, which can be refined for particular applications.
In this chapter, we present such a framework. It provides concepts to
clarify two important aspects of the security analysis in wireless sensor net-
works:
1. What should be protected? Here we offer a set of generic classes of re-
quirements which can be used to structure and refine a set of concrete
security requirements. We highlight the main differences between se-
curity requirements in classical systems and security requirements in
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wireless sensor networks.
2. Against what are we protecting the system? Here we offer a set of
generic attacker models which can be used to choose and refine par-
ticular attacker models for individual systems.
Overall, attacker models in conjunction with security requirements deter-
mine the means to achieve security.
In practice it is very important to formulate realistic security require-
ments and realistic attacker models. Such choices guarantee that precious
resources of wireless sensor networks are invested efficiently. It is therefore
useful to evaluate the practicality of certain attacker models. One metric
to measure practicality is to evaluate the effort an attacker has to invest
to perform certain attacks. We contribute to this area by reporting on a
number of experiments in which we attacked real sensor node hardware.
This chapter is structured as follows: We first present related work in
Section 2.2. We give an overview of security goals in sensor networks, i.e., we
approach the question “what to protect” (Section 2.3). We then report on
experiments in attacking wireless sensor networks in Section 2.4. Building on
these experiences we develop a generic set of attacker models in Section 2.5,
i.e., we approach the question “against which threats to protect”. Finally, we
discuss protection mechanisms in Section 2.6, i.e., we approach the question
“how to protect”. We outline open problems and summarize in Section 2.7.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Security Goals
The most prominent taxonomy of security goals, which is also used in this
thesis, is the CIA taxonomy [82,141] which defines security as the combina-
tion of three attributes: confidentiality, integrity and availability.
There have been many discussions on whether or not the CIA spectrum
really covers all relevant security properties. For example, accountability is
sometimes treated as a property aside from CIA [66], whereas others [2,122]
argue that it falls into the domain of integrity.
2.2.2 Physical Attacks
Physical attacks on embedded systems, that is, on microcontrollers and
smart cards, has been intensively studied before [3, 5, 127, 128]. Skoroboga-
tov describes in depth tampering attacks on microcontrollers, and classifies
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them in the three categories of invasive, semi-invasive, and non-invasive
attacks [127]. Invasive attacks are those which require access to a chip’s in-
ternals, and they typically need expensive equipment used in semiconductor
manufacturing and testing, as well as a preparation of the chip before the
attack can begin. Semi-invasive attacks require much cheaper equipment
and less time than the invasive attacks, while non-invasive attacks are the
easiest.
All these attacks, including the so-called low-cost attacks, if applied to
sensor nodes, would require that they be removed from the deployment area
and taken to a laboratory. Even if in some cases, the laboratory could be
moved into the deployment area in a vehicle, all attacks would require at
least disruption of the regular node operation. Most of the invasive and many
of the semi-invasive attacks also require disassembly or physical destruction
of the sensor nodes.
Skorobogatov also lists several possible classification schemes, including
U. S. government standards, both for attackers, according to their capabil-
ities, and for defenses, according to their abilities to resist attacks from a
certain adversary class.
The existing literature on physical attacks usually assumes that an at-
tacker can gain unsupervised access to the system to be attacked for an
extended period of time. This is a sensible assumption for systems such as
pay-per-view TV cards, pre-paid electricity tokens, or GSM SIM cards. At-
tacks which may take days or even weeks to complete present a real threat
to the security of these systems.
In wireless sensor networks, however, regular communication with neigh-
boring nodes is usually part of normal network operation. Continuous ab-
sence of a node can therefore be considered an unusual condition that can be
noticed by its neighbors. This makes time a very important factor in eval-
uating attacks against sensor nodes, as the system might be able to detect
such attacks while they are in progress and respond to them in real-time.
One of our aims has been to determine the exact amount of time needed to
carry out various attacks. Based on these figures, the frequency with which
neighbors should be checked can be adapted to the desired level of security
and the anticipated threat model.
Finally, the focus of previous work has been mostly on attacking the
components themselves as opposed to the entire products. Attacks on the
circuit-board level have been deliberately excluded from many works, al-
though they are recognized to be security-relevant in some cases. We did
not exclude such attacks from our investigation since our focus was on the
security of the entire node and not only of its individual components.
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Independently and concurrently to our work, Hartung et al. [72] also
investigated sensor node compromise. They showed how to extract data
from the MICA2 nodes using debugging tools, and suggested countermea-
sures which are similar to our recommendations. However, our work is more
systematical, as we develop and investigate a design space for physical at-
tacks on the sensor node hardware. We also looked at multiple types of
sensor nodes, identified some additional attack types, and suggested some
additional countermeasures.
Probably most worrying type of physical attacks on sensor nodes would
be non-invasive side-channel attacks, such as timing and power analysis [87].
To the best of our knowledge, these attacks have not been applied to sensor
networks yet and constitute an interesting direction for future research.
2.2.3 Adversary Models
Adversary models should be defined (and usually are defined) in every pa-
per on WSN security. However, these definitions are informal, and, more
importantly, ambiguous. This makes it impossible to compare different so-
lutions to each other, and to choose a solution which is more appropriate for
a particular situation. To our knowledge, there is no systematic treatment
of adversary models in WSNs in the literature. On the other hand, adver-
sary models is a well-established topic in the area of traditional computer
security and safety.
One of the first well-established formal models in computer security is the
Dolev-Yao model [49]. This model considers an outside adversary who has
the full control over the communication channel. The Dolev-Yao adversary
can eavesdrop, delay, delete, inject, replay and modify messages, but it
cannot compromise nodes.
Node compromise is considered in the area of secure multi-party com-
putation (SMC) [104]. Here, the nodes need to compute a function coop-
eratively, and the outcome of the computation should be kept secret from
the adversary, even if it compromised some nodes, usually t out of n, al-
though the general adversary structures [57] also consider other subsets of
compromised nodes.
The SMC-adversaries can be classified according to multiple (usually,
binary) parameters that can be combined arbitrarily. A passive adversary
knows the program and the memory of the compromised nodes, but does not
influence their protocol behavior, whereas an active adversary can make the
compromised nodes execute arbitrary programs. A computational adversary
cannot break public-key cryptography, whereas an information-theoretical
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adversary possesses unlimited computational resources. If the communica-
tion between the nodes is synchronous, then the adversary cannot delay or
delete messages of the honest participants, whereas in asynchronous com-
munication model the adversary has full control over the communication
channel. An adaptive adversary can compromise nodes at any time dur-
ing the protocol run, whereas the static adversary has to decide beforehand
which nodes to compromise.
The first to our knowledge attacker model for ad hoc networks [77] defines
the n − m attacker model, where the attacker is a legitimate owner of m
nodes, and additionally compromises n nodes belonging to other users. This
attacker model is not quite appropriate for sensor networks considered in this
work, as we assume that all legitimate nodes have the same owner (e.g., the
company that deploys the WSN).
In the area of fault-tolerance no intelligent adversaries are usually con-
sidered, and the adversary models are called failure models. Accordingly,
the compromised, or faulty, nodes are susceptible to the corresponding fail-
ures. Crash failure means that the faulty nodes can crash at some point
in the protocol execution. In the Byzantine failure model, the faulty nodes
may exhibit arbitrary behavior. This means that in the worst case, the
behavior of Byzantine nodes may be the same as that of an intelligent ad-
versary. However, some care is required in using the Byzantine fault model
in security [62]. In the omission model, the nodes can crash or commit
send and receive omissions. That is, the faulty nodes may lose outcoming or
incoming messages without noticing this. In the crash-recovery model, the
crashed nodes can recover from the crash to a predefined state.
In our adversary model for sensor networks we try to merge both models
for security and for fault-tolerance, taking into account the specific features
of sensor networks.
2.3 Security Goals in Sensor Networks
A sensor network can be considered as a highly distributed database. Secu-
rity goals for distributed databases are very well studied: The data should
be accessible only to authorized users (Confidentiality), the data should be
genuine (Integrity), and the data should be always available on the request
of an authorized user (Availability). All these requirements also apply to
sensor networks and their users. Here, the distributed database, as well as
the sensor network, are considered as a single entity from the user’s point
of view. Therefore, we call these security issues outside security. To out-
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side security belong, e.g., query processing [76,120,142], user access control
(considered in this thesis) and large-scale anti-jamming services [147].
The internal organization of a distributed database and of a sensor net-
work are quite different. Outside security, as well as all other types of
interactions between the user and the corresponding system, is based on
the interactions between the internal system components (servers or sensor
nodes, respectively). We call security issues for such interactions inside se-
curity. In sensor networks, inside security realizes robust, confidential and
authenticated communication between individual nodes [84, 139]. This also
includes authenticated querying (considered in this thesis), in-network pro-
cessing [47, 156], data aggregation [29, 159], routing [44, 85] and in-network
data storage [17,64].
Aside from necessitating the distinction between inside and outside se-
curity, sensor networks differ from conventional distributed databases in
other obvious ways: A distributed database consists of a small number of
powerful servers, which are well protected from physical capture and from
network attacks. The servers use resource-demanding data replication and
cryptographic protocols for inside and outside security. In contrast, a sensor
network consists of a large number of resource-constrained, physically unpro-
tected sensor nodes which operate unattended. Therefore, security measures
for distributed databases cannot be directly applied to sensor networks. So
even if a sensor network can be considered as a distributed system (e.g., as
an ad hoc network), sensor networks have some additional constraints which
make security mechanisms for distributed systems inapplicable. Apart from
the obvious resource constraints, single sensor nodes are relatively unim-
portant for the properties of the whole system – at least, if the inherent
redundancy of sensor networks is utilized in their design.
To summarize, security goals in sensor networks are similar to security
goals in distributed databases (outside security) and distributed systems (in-
side security). So these can be taken as an orientation. While requirements
are similar, many standard mechanisms to implement security (e.g., pub-
lic key infrastructures or agreement protocols) are not applicable because
they require too many resources or do not scale to hundreds or thousands
of nodes. This is the dilemma of sensor networks and forces security mech-
anisms in wireless sensor networks to spend the “right” amount of effort
in the “right” places by exploiting the natural features of sensor networks:
inherent redundancy and broadcast communication.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will take a first step towards de-
veloping realistic security mechanisms. We evaluate real attacks in practice
and from this evaluation derive a fine-grained set of abstract attacker as-
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sumptions.
2.4 Real-World Physical Attacks on Sensor Net-
works
In this section we take the viewpoint of an adversary who wishes to violate
one of the security requirements of a WSN which were described in Sec-
tion 2.3. From this viewpoint, a WSN is a very interesting target because
if offers a large attack surface and an interesting playground for creative
attack ideas.
Of course, the many possibilities to attack WSNs include all the tech-
niques known from classic system security. An adversary can eavesdrop on
the communication, perform traffic analysis of the observed network behav-
ior, replay old messages or inject false messages into the network. Possible
are also other types of attacks that aim at violating Availability (denial-of-
service attacks) like jamming the wireless channel. In WSNs these attacks
can be particularly important as they can cause rapid battery drainage and
effectively disable individual sensor nodes or entire parts of a WSN.
While there are many techniques known from other areas of security, the
ability of an attacker to access (and eventually change) the internal state of a
sensor node seems particularly characteristic for sensor networks. This type
of attack is called node capture in the literature [117]. Depending on the
WSN architecture, node capture attacks can have significant impact. For
example, in the TinySec mechanism [84] that enables secure and authenti-
cated communication between the sensor nodes by means of a network-wide
shared master key, capture of a single sensor node suffices to give the ad-
versary unrestricted access to the WSN. Furthermore, most existing routing
schemes for WSNs can be substantially influenced even through capture of
a minute portion of the network [85].
In this section, we determine the actual cost and effort needed to attack
currently available sensor nodes. We especially concentrate on physical at-
tacks which require direct physical access to the sensor node hardware. As
sensor nodes operate unattended and cannot be made tamper proof because
they should be as cheap as possible, this scenario is more likely than in most
other computing environments. Physical attacks of some form are usually
considered a prerequisite to perform node capture.
Another possibility to gain access to the internal state of a sensor node is
to exploit some bugs in software running on the sensor nodes or on the base
stations. These attacks directly correspond to well-known techniques from
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Figure 2.1: General schematic view of sensor node hardware.
classical software security. If a software vulnerability is identified by the
attacker, an attack can be easily automated and can be mounted on a very
large number of nodes in a very short amount of time. Such attacks are rel-
atively well-understood in software security [75]: Possible countermeasures
include a heterogenous network design and standard methods from software
engineering [68, 105, 116, 138]. Software attacks on WSNs have only just
recently came into research focus [59, 69]. Although they constitute a very
interesting research direction, they are out of scope of this thesis.
In the following, we first give some background on physical attacks on
sensor node hardware. Then we report on the effort needed to attack some
current sensor nodes. Where appropriate we also discuss countermeasures
that increase the effort to mount a successful attack. Overall, this section
gives insight into practical attacks on WSNs which motivate the abstract
attacker models which follow in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 Background on Physical Attacks on Sensor Nodes
2.4.1.1 Current Sensor Node Hardware
Currently available sensor nodes typically consist of embedded hardware
with low power consumption, and low computing power. A typical sensor
node contains some sensors (light, temperature, acceleration etc.), a radio
chipset for wireless communication, an EEPROM chip for logging sensor
data, a node-to-host communication interface (typically a serial port), and
a microcontroller which contains some amount of flash memory for program
storage and RAM for program execution. Power is provided by batteries.
Typical choices for the microcontroller are the 8 bit Atmel ATmega 128
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Figure 2.2: Current sensor node hardware: Mica 2 by Crossbow, Berkeley
[103]; Tmote sky by moteiv, Berkeley [111]; and Embedded Sensor Board
by ScatterWeb, Berlin [27]
or the 16 bit Texas Instruments MSP430 family, with the amount of RAM
varying between 2 kB and 10 kB and flash memory ranging from 48 kB to
128 kB. External EEPROM memory can be as small as 8 kB or as large as
1MB. The speed of radio communications is in the order of 100 kbit/s.
The most interesting part for an attacker will be the microcontroller, as
control over this component means complete control over the operation of
the node. However, the other parts might be of interest as well in certain
attack scenario.
Figure 2.1 shows a general schematic view of the hardware of current
sensor nodes, while Figure 2.2 shows photographs of some concrete models
available today. The Crossbow Mica2 nodes [42, 43] (Fig. 2.2, left) use the
8 bit Atmel ATmega 128 microcontroller [7] with 4 kB RAM and 128 kB inte-
grated flash memory, the Atmel AT45DB041B 4Mbit flash memory chip [6],
and the Chipcon CC1000 radio communications chipset [40] with a maxi-
mum data rate of 76.8 kbit/s. Programming is done via the Atmel’s serial
programming interface by placing the node in a special interface board and
connecting it to an RS-232 serial port on the host.
The Telos motes [110,111] (Fig. 2.2, center) by Moteiv utilize the Texas
Instruments MSP430 F1611 microcontroller [134, 135], providing 10 kB of
RAM and 48 kB flash memory. The EEPROM used is the 8Mbit ST Micro-
electronics M25P80 [130], and the radio chipset is the Chipcon CC2420 [41],
whose maximum data rate is 250 kbit/s. Programming is performed by con-
necting to the USB interface and writing memory with the help of the
MSP430 bootloader [132]. A JTAG interface is available as an alternative
programming method and can also be used for debugging.
The Embedded Sensor Boards [27] (Fig. 2.2, right) from ScatterWeb
GmbH are built around the Texas Instruments MSP430 F149 microcon-
troller [133, 135] featuring 2 kB of RAM and 60 kB flash memory, the Mi-
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Figure 2.3: Design space for physical attacks on sensor nodes.
crochip 24LC64 [108] 64 kbit EEPROM, and the RFM TR1001 radio chipset
[109] with a maximum data rate of 19.2 kbit/s. Programming is done either
through a JTAG interface or over-the-air using a gateway.
2.4.1.2 Possibilities for Physical Attacks
Concrete physical attacks on sensor nodes can be classified in several ways.
Our classification takes our previous considerations into account that sensor
nodes are more or less in permanent contact with each other. This means
that long interruptions of regular operation can be noticed and acted upon.
Therefore, attacks which result in a long interruption (e. g. because the
node has to be physically removed from the network and taken to a distant
laboratory) are not as dangerous as those which can be carried out in the
field. Therefore, in the following we concentrate on this type of attacks as
well as on possible countermeasures to be employed by a sensor network.
The two main categories that we use for classifying physical attacks are
(1) the degree of control over the sensor node the attacker gains; and (2)
the time span during which regular operation of a node is interrupted [11].
Figure 2.3 illustrates this design space and classifies example attacks from
the forthcoming Section 2.4.2 according to its criteria.
2.4.2 Examples of In-the-Field Attacks and Countermeasures
As explained above, we especially consider attacks which can be mounted
without noticeable interruption of the regular sensor node operation. We
now discuss some attacks in detail.
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2.4.2.1 Attacks via JTAG
The IEEE 1149.1 JTAG standard is designed to assist electronics engineers
in testing their equipment during the development phase. Among other
things, it can be used in current equipment for on-chip debugging, including
single-stepping through code, and for reading and writing memory.
A JTAG Test Access Port (TAP) is present on both the Atmel and Texas
Instruments microcontrollers used on the sensor nodes described above. All
sensor nodes examined by us have a JTAG connector on their circuit board
allowing easy access to the microcontroller’s TAP. While the capabilities
offered by JTAG are convenient for the application developer, it is clear that
an attacker must not be provided with the same possibilities. Therefore it
is necessary to disable access to the microcontroller’s internals via JTAG
before fielding the finished product.
The MSP430 has a security fuse which can be irreversibly blown (as
described in the data sheet) to disable the entire JTAG test circuitry in
the microcontroller. Further access to the MSP430’s memory is then only
possible by using the Bootstrap Loader. The ATmega128 requires the pro-
grammer to set the appropriate fuses and lock bits, which effectively disable
all memory access via JTAG or any other interface from the outside.
If JTAG access is left enabled, an attacker equipped with an appropriate
adapter cable and a portable computer is capable of taking complete control
over the sensor node. Even if there is no JTAG connector provided on the
circuit board, attackers can still get access to the JTAG ports by directly
connecting to the right pins on the microcontroller which can be looked
up in the datasheet. Typical data rates for JTAG access are 1–2 kB/s, so
reading or writing 64 kB of data takes between 30 and 70 s. However, there
are specialized programming devices on the market which can attain much
higher data rates.
2.4.2.2 Attacks via the Bootstrap Loader
On the Telos nodes, the canonical way of programming the microcontroller is
by talking to the Texas Instruments specific bootstrap loader (BSL) through
the USB interface. The bootstrap loader [132] is a piece of software contained
in the ROM of the MSP430 series of microcontrollers that enables reading
and writing the microcontroller’s memory independently of both the JTAG
access and the program currently stored on the microcontroller.
The BSL requires the user to transmit a password before carrying out
any interesting operation. Without this password, the allowed operations are
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essentially “transmit password” and “mass erase”, i.e. erasing all memory
on the microcontroller.
The BSL password has a size of 16 · 16 bit and consists of the flash
memory content at addresses 0xFFE0 to 0xFFFF. This means in particular
that, immediately after a mass erase operation, the password consists of 32
bytes containing the value 0xFF. The memory area used for the password is
the same that is used for the interrupt vector table, i.e. the BSL password is
actually identical to the interrupt vector table. The interrupt vector table,
however, is usually determined by the compiler and not by the user, although
Texas Instruments documents describe the password as user-settable.
Finding out the password may be quite time-consuming for an attacker.
However, such an investment of time may be justified if a network of nodes
all having an identical password is to be attacked. Therefore, an evaluation
of the possibility to guess the password follows.
Brute Force. As the password is composed of interrupt vectors, certain
restrictions apply to the values of the individual bytes. This section examines
the expected size of the key space and estimates the expected duration of a
brute force attack on the password.
Initially, the key space has a size of 16 · 16 bit = 256 bit. Assuming
a typical compiler (mspgcc 3.2 [112] was tested), the following restrictions
apply:
 All code addresses must be aligned on a 16 bit word boundary, so the
least significant bit of every interrupt vector is 0. This leaves us with
a key space of 16 · 15 bit = 240 bit.
 The reset vector, which is one of the interrupt vectors, is fixed and
points to the start of the flash memory, reducing the key space to
15 · 15 bit = 225 bit.
 Interrupt vectors which are not used by the program are initialized to
the same fixed address, containing simply the instruction reti (return
from interrupt). As a worst case assumption, even the most basic
program will still use at least four interrupts, and therefore have a key
space of at least 4 · 15 bit = 60 bit.
 Code is placed by the compiler in a contiguous area of memory starting
at the lowest flash memory address. Under the assumption that the
program is very small and uses only 2 kB = 211 B of memory, we are
left with a key space of a mere 4 · 10 bit = 40 bit.
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We conclude that the size of the key space for every BSL password is at
least 40 bit.
A possible brute force attack can be performed by connecting a computer
to the serial port (the USB port, in the case of Telos nodes) and consecutively
trying passwords. This can be done by executing a modified version of the
msp430-bsl [112] program that is normally used for communicating with
the BSL.
The rate at which passwords can be guessed was measured to be approx-
imately 12 passwords per second when the serial port was set to 9600 baud.
However, the MSP430 F1611 used on the Telos nodes is capable of a line
speed of 38,400 baud, and at this speed, approximately 31 passwords can be
tried per second. Finally, the BSL program normally waits for an acknowl-
edgment from the microcontroller after each message sent over the serial
line. If this wait is not performed, the speed of password guessing rises to
83 passwords per second.
The maximum speed of password guessing in practice can therefore be
assumed to be 27 passwords per second. This is quite close to the theoretical
limit of 38, 400 bit/s · (256 bit/pw)−1 = 150 pw/s.
Recalling that the key space has a size of at least 40 bit, we can now
conclude that a brute force attack can be expected to succeed on the average
after 240−7−1 s = 232 s ≈ 128 a. As 128 years is well beyond the expected
life time of current sensor nodes, a brute force attack can be assumed to be
impractical.
Knowledge of the Program. One consequence of the fact that the pass-
word is equal to the interrupt vector table is that anyone in possession of an
object file of the program stored on a sensor node also possesses the pass-
word. Worse, even someone who only has the source code of the program
still can get the password if he has the same compiler as the developer, since
he can use this compiler to produce an image from the source code identical
to the one on the deployed nodes.
The secret key in the current TinySec implementation, for example, is
contained in the image but does not influence the interrupt vector table. If
TinySec were ported to Telos motes, the source code and the compiler used
would be sufficient information for an attacker to extract the secret key
material. The same holds for any kind of cryptographic mechanism where
the key material does not influence the interrupt vectors.
Another way of exploiting the identity of the password and the interrupt
vector table is to take one node away from the network and attack the
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microcontroller on this node with classic invasive or semi-invasive methods.
The absence of the node from the network will probably be noticed by the
surrounding nodes and its key(s) will be revoked. However, once the attacker
succeeds with his long-term attack and learns the BSL password of the one
node, it is trivial for him to attack all of the other nodes in the field if they
all have the same BSL password.
If an attacker knows the BSL password, reading or writing the whole
flash memory takes only about 25 s. In order to avoid these forms of attack,
interrupt vector randomization [11] can be used. This significanyly raises the
bar for an attacker but is not yet part of standard software distributions.
2.4.2.3 Attacking the External Flash
Some applications might want to store valuable data on the external EEP-
ROM. For example, the Deluge [78] implementation of network reprogram-
ming in TinyOS stores program images received over the radio there. If
these images contain secret key material, an attacker might be interested in
reading or writing the external memory.
Probably the simplest form of attack is eavesdropping on the conductor
wires connecting the external memory chip to the microcontroller. Using a
suitable logic analyzer makes it easy for the attacker to read all data that are
being transferred to and from the external EEPROM while she is listening.
If a method were found to make the microcontroller read the entire external
memory, the attacker would learn all memory contents. This kind of attack
could be going on unnoticed for extended periods of time, as it does not
influence normal operation of the sensor node.
A more sophisticated attack would connect a second microcontroller to
the I/O pins of the flash chip. If the attacker is lucky, the mote microcon-
troller will not access the data bus while the attack is in progress, and the
attack will be completely unnoticed. If the attacker is skillful, he can sever
the direct connection between the mote microcontroller and the flash chip,
and then connect the two to his own microcontroller. The attacker could
then simulate the external memory to the mote, making everything appear
as normal.
Of course, instead of using his own chip, the attacker could simply do
a “mass erase” of the mote’s microcontroller and put his own program on
it to read the external memory contents. This operation is even possible
without knowledge of the BSL password. While this causes “destruction”
of the node from the network’s point of view, in many scenarios this might
not matter to the attacker.
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The exact amount of time required for the attacks proposed above re-
mains to be determined. It should be noted that some of the attacks outlined
above require a high initial investment in terms of equipment and develop-
ment effort. A possible countermeasure could be checking the presence of the
external flash in regular intervals, putting a limit on the time the attacker
is allowed to disconnect the microcontroller from the external flash.
2.4.2.4 Sensors
Sensor nodes rely on their sensors for information about the real world, so
the ability to forge or suppress sensor data can be classified as an attack.
For instance, a surveillance system might be tricked into thinking that the
situation is normal while the attacker passes unnoticed through the area
under surveillance.
Replacing sensors on the different types of nodes varies in difficulty be-
tween child’s play and serious electrical engineering, mostly depending on
the type of connection between the microcontroller circuit board and the
sensors. A pluggable connection—as present on the Mica2 motes—requires
an attacker to spend only a few moments of mechanical work. If, on the
other hand, the sensors are integrated into the printed circuit board design,
replacing them involves tampering with the conductor wires, cutting them,
and soldering new connections. The amount of time required for this will
vary with the skill of the attacker, but it can be assumed to be in the order
of minutes.
2.4.2.5 Radio
Finally, the ability to control all radio communications of a node might be
of interest to an attacker, e.g., in order to mount an attack using deliberate
collisions on the medium access level. We are unaware of any work trying to
evaluate the effort necessary to perform such an attack and compare its effort
with other attacks that target resource exhaustion and denial-of-service.
2.4.3 Summary
To summarize, we can classify the above attacks into three categories de-
pending on the effort necessary. We list these classes in order of increasing
severity:
1. The class containing the “easy” attacks: Attacks in this class are able
to influence sensor readings, and may be able to control the radio
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function of the node, including the ability to read, modify, delete, and
create radio messages without, however, having access to the program
or the memory of the sensor node. These attacks are termed “easy”
because they can be mounted quickly with standard and relatively
cheap equipment.
2. The class containing the “medium” attacks: Attacks in this class allow
to learn at least some of the contents of the memory of the node, either
the RAM on the microcontroller, its internal flash memory, or the
external flash memory. This may give the attacker, e.g., cryptographic
keys of the node. These attacks are termed “medium” because they
require non-standard laboratory equipment but allow to prepare this
equipment elswehere, i.e., not in the sensor field.
3. The class containing the “hard” attacks: Using attacks in this class
the adversary complete read/write access to the microcontroller. This
gives the attacker the ability to analyze the program, learn secret key
material, and change the program to his own needs. These attacks
are termed “hard” because they require the adversary to deploy non-
standard laboratory equipment in the field.
A different way to classify the above attacks is to look at the time during
which the node cannot carry out its normal operation. Here we have the
following classes:
1. Short attacks of less than five minutes. Attacks in this class mostly
consist of creating plug-in connections and making a few data transfers
over these.
2. Medium duration attacks of less than thirty minutes. Most attacks
which take this amount of time require some mechanical work, for
instance (de-) soldering.
3. Long attacks of less than a day. This might involve a non-invasive or
semi-invasive attack on the microcontroller, e.g., a power glitch attack
where the timing has to be exactly right to succeed, or erasing the
security protection bits by UV light.
4. Very long attacks which take longer than a day. These are usually
invasive attacks on the electronic components with associated high
equipment cost.
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In the following section we take these practical insights as the basis for
devising a framework of adversary models that can be used for security
analysis of WSNs.
2.5 Adversary Models
Adversary models should be determined with respect to applications. Who
are adversaries and what goals do they have? A military sensor network
has other security requirements than a network for habitat monitoring. The
adversaries can be classified according to the following parameters: goals, in-
tervention, presence, and available resources. We first give an overview over
these parameters and then treat the paramaters intervention and presence
in detail later.
2.5.1 Overview
2.5.1.1 Goals
When designing security mechanisms in practice, it helps to know the goals
of the adversary as precisely as possible. Which of the three classical security
requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) does the adversary try
to violate? If the data is valuable (i.e., legitimate users have to pay) or
privacy relevant, the adversary would try to gain unauthorized access. If the
data is critical (e.g., building or perimeter security), the adversary would
try to modify data, such that the alarm is not raised in case of intrusion.
Also a denial-of-service attack can successfully disable the network (violating
Availability).
Identifying the goals of the adversary is probably the most difficult aspect
of security analysis in practice. Therefore the three security requirements
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability are often treated in a uniform
manner (all of them are goals of equal importance).
2.5.1.2 Presence
The parameter presence basically identifies where the adversary acts in a
wireless sensor network. The basic distinguishing factor is the number and
location of the nodes which are in the range of his influence. We distinguish
local, distributed and global adversaries.
26 2 Security Threats and Adversary Models
2.5.1.3 Intervention
While the presence parameter identifies where the adversary can act, the
intervention parameter identifies what the adversary can do in these places.
We distinguish eavesdrop, crashing, disturbing, limited passive, passive, and
reprogramming adversaries. These classes offer incremental steps of power:
Briefly spoken, an eavesdropping adversary can only listen to communica-
tion, a crashing adversary can additionally destroy sensor nodes, a disturbing
adversary can additionally upset sensors by manipulating their location or
their readings, a limited passive adversary can additionally open a node and
steal all its secrets by temporarily removing it from the network, a passive
adversary can steal all secrets without displacing the node, and a repro-
gramming adversary can additionally take full control of a node and cause
it to act in arbitrary ways.
2.5.1.4 Available Resources
There are several resource classes to consider: funding, equipment, expert
knowledge, time. In the world of tamper resistance, the adversaries are di-
vided into three classes: clever outsiders, knowledgeable insiders and funded
organizations [3]. Commodity sensor networks are likely to be attacked
by clever outsiders (who are probably just trying things out) and possi-
bly by knowledgeable insiders, if a substantial gain from the attack can be
expected. Available resources are interdependent with the parameters inter-
vention and presence. However, the precise connection is not always clear.
For example, a global adversary need not to be a funded organization. A
hacker could subvert the entire sensor network by exploiting some software
bug. Or, if a local adversary manages to capture a sensor node and read out
its cryptographic keys, he can turn into a distributed or global adversary,
depending on how many sensor nodes he is able to buy and deploy as clones
of the captured node.
2.5.1.5 Outlook and Notation
In our view, the presence and intervention parameters are the most relevant
ones for basic security analysis. This is why we now look at these two in
detail. Before we present them, we need some formal notation.
We model a sensor network as a graph G = (V,E) where the set V
is the set of sensor nodes and the set E ⊆ V × V defines a neighborhood
relation. The number of all sensor nodes |V | is denoted N . Two sensor
nodes v1 and v2 are neighbors if and only if they are in the neighborhood
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relation, i.e., (v1, v2) ∈ E. A set of nodes V is connected if and only if for
all v1, v2 ∈ V holds that either (v1, v2) ∈ E or (v2, v1) ∈ E. Note that in
our notation E is not necessarily reflexive and transitive because we wish
to model sensor networks at a very low layer, i.e., without any routing or
transport mechanisms.
2.5.2 Presence
We now discuss the different and increasingly severe levels of the presence
parameter. These levels are defined in an incremental fashion, i.e., every
level includes the behavior of the previous one. This implies a total order of
parameter values defined by the subset relationship of behaviors. We begin
our explanations by starting with the weakest level first.
 local adversary
A local adversary can influence a small localized part of the network
[24], for example he has one receiver which can only eavesdrop on
several meters, or can manipulate only the sensor node which is the
closest to him (for example, it is installed in his office).
Formally, an adversary is local if his range of influence contains a small
connected subset S ⊂ V of all sensor nodes. The set S can also be
given as a Boolean function S : V 7→ {true, false}. Such a set is small
if its size is several orders of magnitude smaller than the number of
total nodes, i.e., |S|  N . This set can also change over time, but
changes are rather slow.
In general it is always possible to define S in a time-dependent manner,
i.e., S : V × T 7→ {true, false} where T is the domain of time values.
 distributed adversary
A distributed adversary models either a mobile adversary (a car with
receiver driving around) or managed to install his own sensor nodes in
the sensor field and coordinates them [4].
Formally, an adversary is distributed if its range of influence consists of
multiple unconnected small subsets of nodes of the sensor network. As
an example of such an adversary, consider the assumption that sensor
nodes are attacked randomly following a uniform distribution [159].
In such a case, compromised nodes are distributed over the entire
network, but not wide enough to actually see, hear or listen anything.
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local → distributed → global
Figure 2.4: Adversary presence parameter.
 global adversary
A global adversary is the most powerful level of presence an adversary
can exhibit. Such an adversary can analyze the complete network,
hence his area of influence consists of all sensor nodes.
We define the relation → to order attacker models in the direction of
stronger (i.e., more severe) attacker behavior. Formally, model A → B if
and only if all behaviors which are possible in A are also possible in B
(behavior subsetting). The levels of ability ordered with respect to → are
depicted in Figure 2.4.
2.5.3 Intervention
Now that presence has been investigated and an ordered set of presence
abilities has been given, the same needs to be done for the intervention
capabilities an adversary can be ascribed.
The intervention order is constituted of the following levels, starting from
the weakest and proceeding towards the strongest. Every level contains the
behaviors of all preceding levels.
 eavesdropping adversary
An eavesdropping adversary can just listen to network traffic, do noth-
ing else, in particular no jamming etc. It can then analyse this traffic
either online or offline.
 crashing adversary
A crashing adversary exhibits the simplest form of failure: The node
simply stops to operate (execute steps of the local algorithm). Else-
where this is also called failstop adversary [20]. A crashing adversary
attacks sensors such that they completely break down. The sensors
can be destroyed or drained of energy.
 disturbing adversary
A disturbing adversary can try to partially disturb protocols, even if it
does not have full control over any sensors. It can selectively jam the
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eavesdrop → crash → disturbing → limited passive → passive →
reprogramming
Figure 2.5: Adversary intervention parameter.
network, or fool some sensors into measuring fake data. For example,
it can hold a lighter close to a temperature sensor [142] or re-arrange
the topology of the sensor network by moving sensors around.
 limited passive adversary
An adversary of this level can retrieve all information on a node, but in
order to do so it needs to completely remove the node physically from
the network. This means that the danger of being caught is higher.
 passive adversary
A passive adversary can directly go and open up arbitrary sensor nodes
to get the information currently stored in such a node, there is no
need to leave the network to do so. Furthermore, such an adversary is
assumed to be able to modify the data the node contains.
 reprogramming adversary
A reprogramming adversary can run arbitrary programs on a sensor
node. This can be achieved by exploiting some software bug, or by
probing out cryptographic keys and other secret information and then
cloning the node as described above. The problem of node capture is
typical for a reprogramming adversary.
The order above defines the different abilities of intervention that can
be ascribed to an adversary. These can be ordered according to the relation
→ as defined above (subsets on behaviors), see Figure 2.5.
2.5.4 Adversary Model Lattice
Having defined ordered levels for both presence and intervention, those two
abilities are now combined to form the complete set of adversary models.
A basic adversary model A is a pair (Presence, Intervention), where
the first component specifies the level of presence the adversary model as-
sumes and analogously the second component states the level of interven-
tion. A basic adversary model thus looks like A(local, disturbing), in case
of an adversary with local presence and disturbing skills. The result is a
30 2 Security Threats and Adversary Models
local, reprogramming −−−−−→ distributed, reprogramming −−−−−→ global, reprogrammingx?? x?? x??
local, passive −−−−−→ distributed, passive −−−−−→ global, passivex?? x?? x??
local, limited passive −−−−−→ distributed, limited passive −−−−−→ global, limited passivex?? x?? x??
local, disturbing −−−−−→ distributed, disturbing −−−−−→ global, disturbingx?? x?? x??
local, crash −−−−−→ distributed, crash −−−−−→ global, crashx?? x?? x??
local, eavesdrop −−−−−→ distributed, eavesdrop −−−−−→ global, eavesdrop
Figure 2.6: Adversary Model Lattice
partial order of basic adversary models. This partial order is depicted in
Figure 2.6 as a lattice. It can be seen that the most powerful basic ad-
versary is A(global, reprogramming) (in the upper right corner) and the
weakest is A(local, eavesdrop) (in the bottom left corner). As it is a par-
tial order, not all basic adversary models are comparable in the sense that
one model is truly stronger than another. A(global, eavesdropping) and
A(local, reprogramming) are such a pair, as neither of them is stronger
than the other. However, some models can be put into relation. We take
the relation→ to be the combination of the behavior subsetting ordering de-
fined for presence and intervention parameters above. The resulting partial
order is depicted in Figure 2.6.
There are issues that only concern one ability, either presence or in-
tervention, thus being ignorant about the other ability. For such cases, a ∗
symbol can be inserted for notational convenience into the appropriate com-
ponent of the model to stand of all different levels possible. For instance,
wanting to talk about an adversary that has local presence skills and neglect-
ing completely intervention, the basic adversary model A(local, ∗) would be
appropriate to refer to such an adversary.
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The ordering of the levels of abilities yields the nice property that a state-
ment ascribing a basic adversary of a low level (for example a A(local, ∗))
to perform a malicious action, will automatically ascribe the same for ad-
versaries of higher levels (A(distributed, ∗) and A(global, ∗)). Similarly, it
should be clear that an algorithm that can cope with aA(global, reprogramming)
adversary will be able to sustain all other presented adversaries. However,
as the lattice presents only a partial order, an algorithm coping with a
A(local, limited passive) adversary will not necessary work as well with a
A(global, eavesdrop) adversary.
A fully specified adversary model is a set of basic adversary models
{A1, . . . ,An}. This adversary definition makes it possible to define hybrid
attacker assumptions. For example, an adversary can be global eavesdrop-
ping and local reprogramming at the same time and is then specified as
follows:
{A(global, eavesdrop),A(local, reprogramming)}
2.5.5 Summary
We have presented an abstract framework for modeling attackers in WSNs.
We claim that due to our experiments described in Section 2.4 these abstract
classes model well the critical differences between the hardness of soultions.
2.6 Discussion of Protection Mechanisms
In Section 2.4 we systematically investigated physical attacks on current
sensor node hardware, paying special attention to attacks which can be
executed directly in the deployment area, without interruption of the regular
node operation. We found out that most serious attacks, which result in
full control over a sensor node (node capture), require absence of a node
in the network for a substantial amount of time. We also found simple
countermeasures for some of the most serious attacks.
Thus, in order to design aWSN secure against those node capture attacks
described in this chapter, the following steps should be applied:
 take standard precautions for protecting microcontrollers from unau-
thorized access;
 choose a hardware platform appropriate for the desired security level,
and keep up-to-date with new developments in embedded systems se-
curity;
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 monitor sensor nodes for periods of long inactivity;
 allow for revocation of the authentication tokens of suspicious nodes.
Standard precautions for protecting microcontrollers from unauthorized
access, such as disabling the JTAG interface, or protecting the bootstrap
loader password, are an absolute prerequisite for a secure sensor network.
We developed a method of protecting the bootstrap loader password by
randomization of the interrupt vector table. This allows the developers to
make source code of their products public without fearing that their WSN
can be taken over by everybody who compiles the source code using the same
compiler, thus obtaining the same interrupt vector table, and therefore, the
same BSL password.
As security is a process, not a product, system designers should keep
up-to-date with the developments in attacks on embedded systems. The
security of important systems should be constantly re-evaluated to take new
discoveries into account, as newly found attack methods on microcontrollers
or previously unknown vulnerabilities might make a previously impossible
low-cost attack in the field possible.
The level of security required from the application should also be kept
in mind when choosing hardware. In some cases it might make sense to
build additional protection, such as a secure housing, around a partially
vulnerable microcontroller.
Finally, the removal of a sensor node from the deployment area can be
noticed by its neighbors using, e. g., heartbeat messages or topology change
notifications, as well as by the sensor node itself using, e. g., acceleration
sensors. Appropriate measures can then be taken by the network as well as
by the node itself. The network might consider a node that has been removed
as “captured” and revoke its authorization tokens or initiate recovery when
this node returns to the network [140]. The node itself might react to a
suspected physical attack by erasing all confidential material stored on it.
Mechanisms should be developed that allow a sensor node which has been
absent for too long from the network to be revoked by its neighbors. This is
our future work. Note that depending on the WSN design, local revocation
could be insufficient. For example, if an attacker removes a single sensor
node from the network and successfully extracts the node’s cryptographic
keys, the attacker would be able to clone nodes, to populate the network
with new sensor nodes which all use the cryptographic keys of the captured
sensor node. Thus, a WSN should also be protected from node cloning.
In general, for passive adversaries, encryption techniques often suffice to
ensure inside security. Symmetric key encryption techniques will be favored
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over asymmetric ones because of the computational advantage and the com-
paratively small key sizes. The problems arise in the setup phase of the
network where shared secrets need to be distributed either by the manufac-
turer at production time or by clever protocols at deployment time [4,79].
For stronger adversaries, active attacks like impersonation and node cap-
ture must be taken into account. Ideally, sensor nodes should be made tam-
per proof to prevent node capture, e.g., by applying technology known from
smart cards or secure processing environments. There, memory is shielded
by special manufacturing techniques which makes it more difficult to physi-
cally access the stored information [3]. Similarly, sensor nodes could be built
in a way that they loose all their data when they are physically tampered
with by unauthorized entities.
For large sensor networks, cost considerations will demand that sensor
nodes are not tamper proof. Therefore, node capture must be taken into
account. A first step to protect a sensor network from node capture against
a local or partially present adversary is to use locally distributed protocols
that can withstand the capture of a certain fraction of nodes in the relevant
parts of the network. We give examples of such protocols in Chapters 5
and 6 of this thesis.
2.7 Conclusions
We have described security goals, adversary models and protection mecha-
nisms which are relevant and specific for sensor networks. There are a lot
of interesting problems and open questions in this area:
 Realistic adversary models should be derived with respect to existing
and future applications. Here, experiences with GSM and WLAN
security (and security failures) can be used as a guideline, but every
application needs to define its own adversary model to be able to talk
about security.
 What other attack possibilities exist for sensor networks and how much
effort do they cost to be pursued? For example, are software-based
node capture attacks a real threat? Are side-channel attacks on sensor
nodes possible? We believe both to be true, but we are unaware of
any work which has tried it.
 As cross-layer integration is especially important for resource-constrained
sensor nodes, careful design decisions must be taken concerning which
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security means to put into which layer. For example TinySec [84], a
link layer encryption and message integrity protection mechanism, is
integrated into the radio stack of MICA Motes.
 Building secure sensor networks, especially with respect to active ad-
versary, remains a challenge. Can it be done by combining existing
solutions, such as random key predistribution, secure routing, secure
data aggregation, or would it be too expensive in terms of energy?
Overall, we speculate that probabilistic algorithms which exploit the
redundancy of the sensor network to cause high effort for the adversary will
be good candidates to establish security in such networks. These algorithms
are not suitable to establish perfect security, but offer better scalability and
save resources. The security goals of sensor networks will be probabilistic
and depend on the strength of the adversary.
Chapter 3
Access Control Issues in
Wireless Sensor Networks
3.1 Introduction
In contrast to traditional types of computer networks, sensor networks are
supposed to be application-specific. This means that the design of a sensor
network will depend on its application area. Moreover, resource-efficiency
will ask for cross-layer optimization rather than for clearly layered protocol
design of the ISO/OSI or TCP/IP style. Therefore, the intended application
of the sensor network will affect many aspects of the network, from hard-
ware and radio communication to topology control, routing mechanisms and
communication patterns. Sensor networks for habitat monitoring, home au-
tomation, wildfire detection, supply chain management etc. will differ con-
siderably from each other. Thus, it is difficult to design security solutions
for an “abstract” sensor network. On the other hand, it would be useful
to have security solutions for specific design patterns which are likely to be
present in many sensor networks.
In this thesis, we assume that the considered sensor networks operate
according to the following paradigm. The sensor network is spread over some
geographic area (it can also be a building) and consists of a large amount
of nodes. The maintainer of the sensor network offers services to a large
number of users. The users can post queries to the sensor network. These
queries are propagated into the network, the requested data is collected and
sent back to the user. We believe this paradigm to be generic and useful for
many applications.
In a formal notation, we describe the procedure for the user U to get the
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service from the sensor network WSN as follows:
U →WSN : q
WSN→ U : a(q)
The user sends a query q to the WSN, and receives the answer a(q) to
this query.
With the security goals from Section 2.3 in mind, a robust, confidential
and mutually authenticated communication channel should be implemented
between the user and the WSN. This channel would guarantee authenticity
of the communication partners and integrity, confidentiality and availability
of the messages.
One of the most obvious methods to set up such a channel is to set up
individual channels between the user and every single sensor node. How-
ever, this solution contradicts the concept of sensor networks which includes
cooperation between the sensor nodes such as multi-hop communication, in-
network data processing and aggregation of the requested data while it is
transported to the user. A secure authenticated channel between two en-
tities implies that nobody can interfere in the channel, which excludes any
cooperation.
Therefore, other solutions are required in sensor networks. In the fol-
lowing, we consider an interesting subproblem that arises in securing sensor
networks with the described communication pattern: access control to the
sensor network data.
The problem of access control can be considered as restricting access to
resources to privileged entities [106]. That is, only legitimate users should
be able to access the data.
Which possibilities does an adversary have for gaining unauthorized ac-
cess to the data? On the one hand, the adversary can try to impersonate
a legitimate user. Thus, the sensor network should implement an access
control procedure for the users. On the other hand, the adversary can also
attack other mechanisms and protocols of the sensor network. This means
that the access control mechanism for the users (outside security, see Sec-
tion 2.3) as well as internal mechanisms, e.g., routing, in-network processing
and data aggregation (inside security), should be secure against the consid-
ered adversary type.
The most severe security breach with respect to access control to the
data is the possibility for the adversary to send arbitrary queries to the
sensor network. In this case, the adversary would receive the same service
as legitimate users. In this thesis we consider the mechanisms that prevent
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the adversary from sending its own queries into the network in the presence
of node capture attacks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. System and adversary
models employed for the analysis of access control throughout this thesis
are presented in Section 3.2. Furthermore we consider special characteris-
tics of access control in sensor networks with respect to the specific system
and adversary model in Section 3.3, and present access control phases in
Section 3.4. Finally, we develop a design space for access control solutions
in Section 3.5 and conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 System and Adversary Model
Sensor network architecture. We consider a sensor network which is
deployed over a large geographic area. The network consists of a large
number of resource constrained sensor nodes and a base station that has
more resources than the sensor nodes. For example, it can be laptop class
device. The base station is a trusted entity which can be used for network
management, including security-related tasks. The adversary cannot gain
control over the base station.
Users. The maintainer of the sensor network offers services to a large
number of mobile users. Legitimate users can send queries to the sensor
network.
Throughout this thesis we consider two alternative possibilities of access-
ing the network for the users: They can either log in into the base station
which communicates with the sensor nodes on their behalf, or they can go
into the network area with some wireless mobile device like a PDA or a
mobile phone and access the nodes in their communication range.
In the latter case, we assume the number of nodes that are in communi-
cation range of the user to be not less than some threshold, this threshold
being a system parameter.
Queries. Queries can be injected into the sensor network either at a base
station (like in TinyDB [101] or Cougar [150]) or at any sensor node (like
in Directed Diffusion [81]). The queries may be first optimized or other-
wise processed at the place of injection and then they are disseminated into
the sensor network using multihop communication according to some query
processing mechanism.
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Adversary. The goal of the adversary is to post arbitrary unauthorized
queries to the sensor network or to disrupt the sensor network operation such
that the queries of the legitimate users are not answered by the network.
Following the terminology and the security goals described in Section 2.3,
the adversary seeks to violate confidentiality and availability of the sensor
network data, and integrity of data requests with respect to outside security.
We do not consider availability and integrity of sensor network data, as
well as confidentiality of data requests.
The adversary can capture a small amount of sensor nodes, that is, it can
read out all their memory contents, and make them run arbitrary programs.
This means that in the terminology developed in Section 2.5 our adver-
sary consists of two basic adversary models:
{A1(global, eavesdrop),A2(distributed, reprogramming)}
In particular, this means that the adversary can analyze network traffic
before compromising nodes. Thus, we do not consider any special distribu-
tion of sensor nodes and assume that the distribution of the captured nodes
is the worst possible.
As the adversary can capture some sensor nodes, it would have access
to all data measured by these sensor nodes, and to all data routed through
them (in case the data are unprotected or can be decrypted by means of
captured cryptographic keys). This data disclosure cannot be prevented in
face of node captures. Nevertheless, the adversary should not be able to post
arbitrary queries to the sensor network, thereby receiving the same service
as the honest users.
3.3 Access Control Problems in Sensor Networks
According to our system model, the users can inject queries into the sensor
network either at the base station or at some sensor nodes. We consider
these two possibilities in the face of node capture attacks.
3.3.1 Access Control via Base Station
In the case the users can post their queries using the base station, an access
control mechanism should be implemented in the base station. However,
this “front-end” access control mechanism alone does not suffice since an
impostor could masquerade as a sensor node and access the data behind the
base station.
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For example, in TinyDB [101] the queries are disseminated using flood-
ing. During the flooding process, a spanning tree for sending the answer to
the query back to the base station is constructed. Thus, even if there is an
access control mechanism at the base station, the adversary can still send
arbitrary queries if it captures one sensor node. The captured node would
send the adversary’s queries to its neighbors, the queries would propagate
into the network, and the spanning trees for the answers will be rooted at
the compromised node.
This means that some form of access control must also apply in the
“back-end” of the communication chain. That is, each query should be
accompanied by a proof of its legitimacy, such that each sensor node can
verify that the query was inserted into the network by the base station.
This proof of legitimacy must be of course secure in the presence of the
anticipated adversary, in our case, in the presence of node captures.
3.3.2 Decentralized Access Control
If the users can post their queries using the ordinary sensor nodes, then
the access control mechanism should be built into each node, as the “front-
end” for the user can be any sensor node. Moreover, just like in the case of
the base station, a proof of legitimacy is needed for the “back-end” of the
network, that is, for all nodes which did not participate in the process of
access control directly. Alternatively, the user could directly log in into each
sensor node which holds the requested information. However, as we assume
a large sensor network, this solution is impractical.
Are there any additional problems which arise when the users can start
their queries at the sensor nodes? Consider the following example.
Directed Diffusion [81], a popular paradigm for organizing sensor net-
works, allows the user to post queries at any arbitrary sensor node (called
the sink). The sink then floods the network with the query. After some
time, sensor nodes start sending their aggregated data towards the sink.
The sink gives the data to the user. In this case, to prevent the adversary
from querying the sensor network, an access control mechanism should be
built into each sensor node.
Consider an adversary who wants to gain unauthorized access to the
data. It can try either to subvert the access control mechanism, or to
find some weaker point in the sensor network architecture. For example,
if the communication between the sensors happens without encryption and
authentication, the adversary would bypass access control mechanism by
directly attacking the communication protocol (eavesdrop, insert its own
40 3 Access Control Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks
messages).
However, even if all communication between the nodes is properly en-
crypted and authenticated, access control remains a separate problem which
has to be solved. To illustrate this, consider a sensor network with Directed
Diffusion mechanism where the sink is able to organize secure and authen-
ticated communication with all other sensor nodes.
Suppose that, additionally to secure authenticated communication with
the sink, some access control mechanism is built into each sensor node.
However, if the adversary can disable the access control mechanism on a
single sensor node, for example by capturing it, it would be able to query
the entire sensor network. This single sensor, acting as a new sink, will
build a secure authenticated channel to other sensor nodes, but this would
not prevent the adversary from unauthorized data access. This happens
because any arbitrary sensor is authorized to act on behalf of the user.
From the above example we can see that in case the users can start
their queries at any node in the network, the “front-end” access control
mechanism for the users cannot rely on a single sensor, but should be able
to withstand node capture. Thus, to prove user’s legitimacy, the user should
be able to log in into multiple sensor nodes. Moreover, these nodes should
be able to provide a proof of the query legitimacy for the rest of the nodes.
3.4 Two Phases of Access Control to Sensor Net-
work Data
In the previous section we have seen that a practical and secure in the face
of node captures access control solution can be divided into the “front-end”
part, where the user directly logs in into the base station or some sensor
nodes, and the “back-end” part, where the nodes which did not communicate
with the user directly can assure themselves that the query was posted by
a legitimate user by means of some proof appended to it. In the following
we call this proof the authenticator.
We call the “front-end” part user access control and the “back-end” part
authenticated querying. In the following we formally define both phases of
access control.
3.4.1 User Access Control
The process of access control can be separated into authentication and au-
thorization [66, 106]. Authentication means establishing a relation between
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the user and some identity. Authorization means establishing a relation be-
tween a user and a set of privileges (access rights or allowed operations).
Here we consider user authentication as a key operation for user access con-
trol.
3.4.1.1 User Access Control at the Base Station
Menezes et al. [106, p. 386] define the term entity authentication as “. . . the
process whereby one party is assured [. . . ] of the identity of a second party
involved in a protocol. . . ”. We call the first party the prover P , and the
second party the verifier V .
We now define the properties of authentication protocols. These prop-
erties are defined with respect to the two primitive operations of authenti-
cation: (1) authenticate(V, I) is invoked by the prover P whenever P would
like to be authenticated by V using identity I ∈ I; (2) associate(P, I) is
invoked by the verifier whenever it has established the relation between P
and some identity I.
An authentication protocol is correct if the identity associated to P by V
is the “real” identity of P . If P is dishonest or claims to have a fake identity
this is indicated by a special value ⊥ which is supposed to be distinct from
any value in I. Authentication is successful if V invokes associate(P, I) with
some I 6= ⊥.
Definition 1 (Authentication) A protocol solves authentication if it sat-
isfies the following properties:
 (Termination) If P invokes authenticate(V, I) then eventually an hon-
est V invokes associate(P, I) for some I ∈ I or I = ⊥.
 (Validity) An honest verifier V invokes associate(P, I) for I ∈ I only
if P in fact has identity I.
3.4.1.2 Decentralized User Access Control
In the case of decentralized access control, the user has to perform authen-
tication and authorization not with a single party (the base station), but
with a distributed entity, which is composed of several sensor nodes, as the
access control operation cannot depend on a single node. One possibility
to do this is for the user to execute a separate access control protocol with
each of the nodes. We denote the distributed verifier as a set of entities
V = {V1, . . . .Vn}
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Essential is that the distributed access control protocol should be resilient
to the capture of sensor nodes. That is, even if the adversary captures some
nodes, these nodes together should not be able to give the adversary access
to the data. We discuss corresponding examples in Sections 5.5 and 6.6.
We now introduce the notion of n-authentication, a resilient version of
simple authentication. To distinguish the primitive operations of simple
authentication from those of n-authentication we denote the latter ones with
n-associate(P, I) and n-authenticate(V, I). Note that n-authenticate refers
to the entire set of verifiers while n-associate just refers to a single prover.
Definition 2 (n-Authentication) A protocol solves n-authentication if it
satisfies the following properties:
 (Termination) If P invokes n-authenticate(V, I) then eventually all
honest Vi ∈ V invoke n-associate(P, Ii) for some Ii ∈ I or Ii = ⊥.
 (Validity) An honest verifier Vi invokes n-associate(P, I) only if P in
fact has identity I ∈ I.
 (Agreement) If honest verifier Vi invokes n-associate(P, I ′) and honest
verifier Vj invokes n-associate(P, I ′′) then I ′ = I ′′.
If we assume that at most t verifiers fail, then n-authentication ensures
that the remaining (at least n − t) verifiers eventually successfully authen-
ticate an honest prover and that they agree on his identity. If a prover
is dishonest or claims to have a fake identity then all honest verifiers will
return ⊥ so that the prover is not authenticated.
3.4.2 Authenticated Querying
We now define the second phase of the access control which belongs to
the realm of inside security in sensor networks and is called authenticated
querying.
Let WSN be a sensor network. After receiving a query, each sensor node
decides whether the query was inserted by a legitimate user. If its decision
is positive, we say that the node accepts the query. Consider an arbitrary
query q. Let Sq be the set of all nodes which must process the query in
order to give the required answer to the user. The WSN design satisfies
authenticated querying if it satisfies the following properties:
 (Safety) If a sensor node s in WSN accepts the query q as a legitimate
query, then q was originated by a legitimate user.
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 (Liveness) Any legitimate query q will be processed by at least all
nodes in Sq.
The problem of authenticated querying is often considered in the litera-
ture on sensor network security under the name of broadcast authentication.
Broadcast authentication is a classical computer security problem where a
singe sender needs to authenticate its messages to multiple receivers. Some
of the receivers are supposed to be “dishonest” with the goal of computing a
fake authenticated message that the “honest” receivers accept as being sent
by the sender [106].
In case the users post their queries using the base station, the sensor
nodes need to ascertain that the query originates from the base station.
In this case the base station appends an authenticator to the query. For
example, the base station could digitally sign the query, and the sensor
nodes could verify the signature using the preloaded public key of the base
station. However, this solution implies the use of public-key cryptography
which is often considered too resource-intensive for being practical in sensor
networks. For example, using the most efficient (to our knowledge) library
for asymmetric cryptography [70], verification of a digital signature would
still require half a second.
In Chapters 5 and 6 we consider more efficient ways of generating an
authenticator. More precisely, we develop novel solutions for broadcast au-
thentication in presence of node capture attacks.
If the users directly log in into locally available sensor nodes, these nodes
have to jointly compute the authenticator. This method is bound to be more
difficult to realize, as the sensor nodes can be captured, and therefore, in
contrast to the base station which cannot be captured, a single sensor node
cannot be entrusted with the full information needed to generate the au-
thenticator. In Sections 5.5 and 6.6 we make suggestions on how to organize
this kind of authenticated querying.
3.4.3 Putting the Two Phases Together
If the number of users is large, the natural method to use for authentication
is public-key cryptography because of its scalability. On the other hand,
public-key cryptography is power-consuming, so the sensor nodes should
communicate with each other using symmetric-key cryptography.
In the concept presented here we let the base station, or the nodes in
the communication range of the user to serve as interpreters (or a gateway)
between the “public-key crypto world” of the user and the “symmetric-key
44 3 Access Control Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks
crypto world” of the WSN. The user communicates with the base station
or to the nodes in its communication range using public-key cryptography,
and the base station or the nodes then communicate with the remainder of
the sensor network on behalf of the user using symmetric-key cryptography.
This happens in the following two phases:
1. Secure channel setup between the user and the WSN : The user exe-
cutes a mutually authenticated key establishment protocol [106] using
public-key cryptography with the base station or with some specified
sensor nodes. For example, the number of such nodes can be specified,
or the nodes can be selected according to some other criteria. The pro-
tocol results in the establishment of shared session keys between the
user and each honest node which participated in the protocol run.
2. Authenticated querying : After the successful secure channel setup, the
base station or the nodes in user’s proximity forward user’s queries into
the sensor network and append to them some additional information
enabling the other nodes to verify the legitimacy of the query.
The first phase naturally includes the user authentication phase consid-
ered in Section 3.4.1. Although a secure channel is not required for access
control, it is considered here because secure channel setup is a very well
studied standard procedure and incurs marginal additional costs in compar-
ison to unilateral user authentication. Additionally, secure channels between
the users and the WSN are very likely to be required in the overall WSN
design. For example, the answer to the query should be kept confidential.
Moreover, the user should also be able to ascertain that it communicates
with the genuine sensor network.
In contrast to the first phase, we do not consider authenticated answers
(reports) to the query in the second phase. Although authenticated reports
are just as important as authenticated queries, there is no standard solu-
tion to this problem. Moreover, this is one of the most interesting current
research topics (see Sections 4.8 and 4.9). However, this problem is out of
scope of this thesis.
We briefly outline a possible solution to access control assuming that the
query is addressed to a single sensor node s. The user first sends the query
to the surrounding nodes using the previously established secure channels.
Each node computes a message authentication code (MAC) on the query
using the key shared with the node s. For example, these keys could be
computed using polynomial-based key predistribution [95]. The computed
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MACs are sent back to the user who appends them to the query. The node
s answers the query only if enough MACs are appended.
Note that in this solution, no coordination between the nodes in user’s
proximity is required. The node s answers the query only if enough MACs
are appended to it. Such solutions should generally be preferred, as co-
ordination requires additional messages, and therefore, additional resource
consumption.
The above solution explains the idea and shows the feasibility of our
approach. However, it has many drawbacks. It does not scale well, and
the legitimacy of the query cannot be verified by intermediate sensor nodes
which route the query to the node s. The presence of the latter feature would
enable early rejection of illegitimate queries. We consider more practical and
sophisticated solutions in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.4.4 Choice of the Public-Key Cryptosystem
We now consider which public-key cryptosystems are well suited for the user
access control.
RSA with small public exponent ( [71,145]) and Rabin public key cryp-
tosystems [63] have got fast algorithms for encryption and digital signature
verification. However, decryption and signature generation are slow and
resource-demanding. Therefore, these cryptosystems can be used in sensor
networks only if the sensor nodes are not required to decrypt or to sign
messages.
In contrast, elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) [71, 102] require more
overhead for encryption and signature verification than for decryption and
signing. Nevertheless, with ECC, not only encryption and signature verifi-
cation, but also decryption and signing are feasible for sensor nodes. As we
target mutual authentication, ECC seems to be more suitable for implemen-
tation of robust user authentication, even though the sensor nodes in this
case have to execute relatively expensive for ECC signature verification.
The feasibility of ECC for sensor networks was demonstrated by Gupta
et al. [70]. They implemented the SSL protocol on MICA2 motes using
elliptic curve cryptography. Their SSL handshake takes less than 4s.
3.5 Design Space for Access Control
Two following dimensions can be identified for access control in sensor net-
works:
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multihop: no multihop: yes
BS: yes direct base station AC remote base station AC
Section 3.5.1.1 Section 3.5.1.2
BS: no direct decentralized AC remote decentralized AC
Section 3.5.2.1 Section 3.5.2.2
Table 3.1: Design space for realizing access control (AC) in sensor networks.
“BS: yes” means that the base station must be accessed before the query
processing can be started by the network. “Multihop: yes” means that mul-
tihop communication is needed before the query processing can be started
by the network.
 The user has to communicate with the base station in order to post
queries vs. the query can be started at some sensor nodes.
 The sensor network has to forward some data using multihop commu-
nication before the user can start posting queries vs. the query can be
started locally.
These two dimensions give four possibilities for access control (AC) as
depicted in Table 3.1: direct base station AC, remote base station AC, direct
decentralized AC, and remote decentralized AC.
Each of these mechanisms is appropriate in different situations and re-
quires different solutions. In Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 each mechanism from
the design space is discussed. The mechanisms are also depicted in Fig-
ures 3.1(a)-(d).
3.5.1 Base Station Access Control
Base stations are supposed to have more resources and to be better protected
against attacks than sensor nodes. Therefore, using base station is a natural
approach to organize such a critical task as access control.
3.5.1.1 Direct Base Station Access Control
Here the query is always started at the base station, either by physically
approaching it with a device and connecting to it (wirelessly or not), or
by routing the query through some external network (e.g., the Internet)
which is connected to the base station. Users log in into the base station
using an arbitrary client/server authentication protocol [106]. If the user is
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(a) Direct base station AC
  
(b) Remote base station AC
  
(c) Direct decentralized AC
  
(d) Remote decentralized AC
Figure 3.1: Design space for access control (AC) in sensor networks. Entities
that generate the authenticator for the query, as well as the connections
(sometimes, multihop) between the network and the user, are depicted with
thick lines.
successfully authenticated, it can post arbitrary queries to the base station.
The base station forwards (possibly optimized) user’s queries into the sensor
network.
In this case, the base station has to implement authenticated querying
(Section 3.4.2). Then all nodes that process the query can verify that it
originated at the base station. Any method for broadcast authentication
presented in Section 4.6 can be used here.
3.5.1.2 Remote Base Station Access Control
The query can be started on some sensor nodes. Nodes are not concerned
with query authentication, but just route the authentication information
to the base station, the base station authenticates the user and then gives
permission to the sensor network to answer user’s queries. Thus, the base
station helps to establish trust between the sensor network and the users.
Here, at least two scenarios are possible:
 User’s queries are always routed to the base station. The base station
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sends authenticated queries into the network on behalf of the user,
receives the answers, and sends the answers back to the user. In this
case, an SSL-like protocol can be used to set up a secure authenticated
channel between the user and the base station.
 The base station generates a kind of “ticket” (using Kerberos termi-
nology) which enables the user to talk to the sensor network for some
time. The ticket is sent back to the user who uses it to generate
authenticated queries.
Note that the user may still have to authenticate to several sensor nodes,
because otherwise an adversary could flood the network with fake requests
that will have to be routed to the base station.
3.5.1.3 Access Control Using Base Station: Pros and Cons
Advantages. The base station has more resources than a sensor node
and therefore, can implement stronger security measures. It can be placed
in dedicated locations and maintained by humans. This makes the base
station more reliable and secure: It can be protected from physical access,
and DoS or penetration attacks are more likely to be spotted quickly.
Disadvantages. The base station serves as a dedicated authentication
server. Therefore, it must be very well protected from both physical and
remote access by unauthorized entities. In the literature it is usually as-
sumed that to take over a base station is more difficult than a sensor node.
In practice, the reverse could be the case. For example, if the base station is
connected to a popular web server with known vulnerabilities, the penetra-
tion of the base station could be a matter of utilizing an available exploit.
Besides, it is not always possible or desirable to place a base station into a
dedicated secure location, especially if it is supposed to communicate with
the sensor nodes wirelessly.
Furthermore, if the direct physical access is needed for the authentication
(e.g., wireless communication with the base station), it might be inconve-
nient to the user to walk through the half deployment area to the base
station while needing the data from nodes in user’s proximity. In case of
remote access, several messages have to be routed between the base station
and the user by the sensor network, which can be impractical if the base
station is far away. The user might also have to wait for the answer of the
far away base station while needing the data from the nodes close-by.
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And finally, as the nodes close to the base station are more heavily loaded
with communication, their energy is exhausted more quickly, which leads to
shorter network lifetime.
3.5.2 Decentralized Access Control
In cases where the base station cannot be used for access control, an access
control mechanism should be built into sensor nodes. However, as shown in
Section 3.3.2, relying on any arbitrary node for access control is not sound
in face of node capture attacks. A natural solution here would be to use a
distributed algorithm for access control.
3.5.2.1 Direct Decentralized Access Control
Here the legitimacy of the user is verified by the nodes in user’s location,
e.g., in his communication range. Of course, even if the nodes in user’s
proximity successfully verified the query, they still need some means to tell
to the rest of the sensor network that this query originates from a legitimate
user. That is, at least all nodes that process the query should be able to
verify its legitimacy.
3.5.2.2 Remote Decentralized Access Control
The legitimacy of the user is verified by several nodes which not need to be
close to the user. These nodes can be specially chosen for this purpose, then
the network architecture might be heterogeneous, with dedicated authen-
tication devices placed in some locations. On the other hand, these nodes
might be selected from the set of all nodes according to some algorithm. We
do not consider remote decentralized access control in this thesis and leave
it to future work.
3.5.2.3 Access Control without Base Station: Pros and Cons
Advantages. Users can start queries locally in the sensor network, with-
out going to the base station or some other access point (e.g., an Internet
terminal). Furthermore, the query can be processed and answered locally.
No routing to the base station is needed for answering the query. Still, rout-
ing can be needed if the query concerns sensor data which are not in the
user’s proximity. And last but not least, if the base station is overloaded
or taken over, the data are still available and not compromised (at least,
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as long as the compromised base station can be excluded from the network
management).
Disadvantages. The most severe disadvantage is that user authentication
costs extra computation and communication power, especially if it is done in
distributed fashion, using replication and agreement techniques, or public-
key cryptography. Distributed algorithms have to be applied in order to
cope with unreliability and insecurity of individual nodes.
3.6 Conclusions
Access control to sensor network data consists of two phases. During the
user access control the user proves its legitimacy to the base station or to
the surrounding sensor nodes. This phase belongs to the realm of outside
security. In the phase of authenticated querying user’s query is forwarded
into the network accompanied by an authenticator. The authenticator en-
ables the nodes that did not participate in the user access control phase to
verify the legitimacy of the query.
Depending on the sensor network architecture, centralized (via base sta-
tion) or decentralized data access is possible. This calls for different solutions
to the data access control.
In the following Chapter 4 we present some background information and
related work on sensor network security that is relevant for access control
mechanisms developed in this thesis. Furthermore, in Chapters 5 and 6 we
consider some approaches to the centralized access control, and also discuss
issues that arise in case these solutions should be adapted for decentralized
access control.
Chapter 4
Background And Related
Work on WSN Security
4.1 Introduction
We now present some background on sensor network architecture and se-
curity, and also some related work that considers access control in sensor
networks from different points of view.
In order to design an access control system for sensor networks one needs
to know how the sensor networks work. Therefore, in Section 4.2 we intro-
duce query processing systems for sensor networks. These systems are used
to extract data from the sensor network. They include mechanisms for query
dissemination, in-network data processing and data collection. We further
concentrate on query dissemination in Section 4.3. This is due to the fact
that any access control mechanism should prevent the adversary from in-
terfering with the query dissemination mechanism. This means that the
network should be protected from injection of unauthorized queries.
In Section 4.4 we give background information on the access control
problem in traditional security, and also an overview of related work on this
topic.
In the rest of this chapter we consider security problems from the realm of
sensor networks that are especially relevant for our work. We start with the
establishment of cryptographic keys (Section 4.5) that is the precondition
for every security mechanism. One of most distinctive features of key estab-
lishment techniques in sensor networks is the frequent use of probabilistic
mechanisms that guarantee key secrecy only with some predefined probabil-
ity. In Chapter 6 of this work we develop an access control mechanism that
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follows the same paradigm.
Section 4.6 considers broadcast authentication in sensor networks. As
noted in the previous chapter, access control in sensor networks consist of
two phases (Section 3.4): user access control and authenticated querying.
The latter is a special case of broadcast authentication. Here we consider
desirable properties for broadcast authentication in sensor network such that
it can be employed for authenticated querying and give a detailed overview
of the most relevant related work.
In Sections 4.7 we consider secure code update techniques. Secure code
update constitutes a specific variant of broadcast authentication that usually
cannot be used for authenticated querying in general. Nevertheless, secure
code update techniques can be used in some specific cases, e.g. if the content
of queries is known beforehand.
In Sections 4.8 and 4.9 we present related work on the authentication of
the answers to the query, also called report authentication. Although the
information flow in this case is from the sensor nodes to the user, report
authentication and query authentication techniques are inherently interde-
pendent. Indeed, in Chapter 5 of this thesis we present a mechanism for
authenticated querying that is based on an already existing mechanism for
report authentication.
We conclude our overview in Section 4.10.
4.2 Query Processing Systems
Query processing systems for sensor network comprise mechanisms for query
optimization at the base station, query dissemination, local query process-
ing that takes place on single sensor nodes, and report collection. Thus,
any access control mechanism should work together with the query process-
ing system employed in the particular sensor network and ensure that only
legitimate entities can start the queries.
One of the most popular query processing systems is Directed Diffu-
sion [81]. It allows the user to post queries (tasks) starting at any arbitrary
sensor nodes (called the sink). The sink firstly floods the network with an
exploratory query (an interest), and the process of the interest dissemina-
tion, as well the process of getting the answers to the exploratory query, is
used to build up a network structure (usually a spanning tree) for the dis-
semination of the “real” query and the report collection. Directed Diffusion
uses a customized language for the task description.
TinyDB [101] and Cougar [150] suggest distributed query processing sys-
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tems where the queries are formulated in the SQL-like manner. The queries
are submitted to a powerful base station that optimizes them and are dis-
seminated into the network via flooding. The routing tree for the data
collection is constructed during the flooding process.
Without going into details of how the query is processed by the network,
it is important to notice that the query processing systems use flooding for
query dissemination. Some useful flooding variants are considered in the
next section.
4.3 Query Dissemination
Query dissemination is an especially interesting issue for access control, as
the adversary should be prevented from inserting its own queries at any
point of the network. Thus, we consider data dissemination in the direction
from the base station to the sensor nodes.
As mentioned in the previous section, a widespread way of query dissem-
ination is flooding. In the most basic flooding protocol every node relays
the received message to all its neighbors if it has not received this message
previously, and drops the message otherwise. Unfortunately, this method
is both unreliable (nodes are not guaranteed to receive the packets) and
wastes energy because of redundant packet broadcasts [136]. Furthermore,
most nodes receive the query more than once. This should be avoided, since
receiving messages also consumes energy.
To avoid the disadvantages of simple flooding, several mechanisms have
been proposed [129, 146, 152]. For example, in probabilistic flooding the
nodes relay messages with some predefined probability. In counter-based
flooding, if a node hears more than k of its neighbors rebroadcast the mes-
sage, it suppresses its own transmission. In neighbor-knowledge-broadcasting
schemes, nodes use detailed local topology information to determine which
nodes must rebroadcast a message.
To improve reliability of query dissemination, transport protocols for
sensor networks were developed. The protocol PSFQ (pump slowly, fetch
quickly) [143] reliably disseminates data streams consisting of many packets.
The packets are distributed “slowly” in the network, such that if some node
lost a packet with a specific sequence number, it does not broadcast the
packets with higher sequence number to its neighbors, but asks the neighbors
to supply it with the lost packet first. This way, packet losses are not
propagated through the network, but recovered “quickly”. There is also a
mechanism to report to the base station about the delivery status.
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The transport protocol GARUDA [114] disseminates data streams using
a structure called core that approximates the minimum dominating set of
the network and is constructed during the dissemination of the first packet.
Packets are first reliably distributed to the core members, the latter relay
the packets to all other nodes.
We note that any security mechanisms for query dissemination should be
able to work with the corresponding query dissemination protocols. In this
thesis, we develop protocols for secure query dissemination along a spanning
tree (see Chapter 5) as well as protocols that can work on top of any query
dissemination technique (see Chapter 6).
4.4 Access Control
A method of access control should provide access to legitimate users and
deny access to illegitimate ones. There are two main issues in this process
[66,106]. Authentication means establishing a relation between the user and
some identity. Authorization means establishing a relation between a user
and a set of privileges (access rights or allowed operations). An identity
is the individuality property of a user which ideally cannot be forged or
copied. In practice, identities are implemented by items which users know
(passwords), possess (secret keys or security tokens) or properties which
they have (biometrics).
In authentication, a user sends its name (e.g., IP address) and proof of
its identity to the base station, and the base station should be able to decide
whether or not the identity is valid and in fact belongs to the user of that
name. This can be done, e.g., by verifying a digitally signed certificate.
In authorization, a user sends its name together with the requested ac-
cess operations (e.g., read, write) to the base station, and the base station
should be able to decide whether or not this user is allowed to perform this
operation. This is usually implemented by access control lists.
Finally, in access control, a user sends its name, identity, and the re-
quested operation to the base station. The base station first authenticates
the user, i.e., it checks the validity of the name and identity. Upon successful
authentication, the base station authorizes the user, i.e., it checks the access
permissions of that user. If both checks succeed, the user is granted access
to the data.
In practice, authentication, authorization and data access are combined
into one single operation. A request is sent, the access control mechanism
checks legitimacy (authentication and authorization), and sends a response
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back to the user (which may be the data requested or a message “access
denied”).
To our knowledge, algorithms for access control in sensor networks that
can withstand malicious node capture have not been considered so far. How-
ever, there is rich literature on authentication in wireless ad hoc networks. In
this context, authentication of single nodes to other members of the ad hoc
network is considered, which is an aspect of inside security and so unrelated
to access control for outsiders (users) that we consider here. Some solutions
use threshold cryptography [88, 155], others use hierarchical network archi-
tecture and public-key cryptography [137] or symmetric mechanisms [10].
However, none of these methods is really applicable to sensor networks due
to extensive use of resource consuming cryptography or unsuitable methods
for bootstrapping trust, e.g., using physical contact of devices as in [10].
4.5 Key Establishment
The establishment of pairwise keys is a crucial prerequisite for virtually all
security schemes. One of the most popular ideas in sensor network is to
organize symmetric key establishment by means of random key predistribu-
tion [37, 55, 79, 158], where the keys are drawn from a large key pool such
that any two sensor nodes receive several keys before the deployment. After
the deployment, the nodes have to discover whether they share any keys
with their neighbors.
Further schemes combine random key predistribution with the previ-
ously known methods for conference key establishment where each node can
compute the key it shares with any other node [53,97].
The localised encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP) presented
in [156] finds that different tasks require different security policies. Hence, it
establishes four types of keys to meet these different requirements. In partic-
ular, each node maintains an individual key shared with the base station, a
group key for each group the node participates in, a cluster key shared with
all its neighbors and a pairwise keys for each of its immediate neighbors. A
similar approach is taken in [48].
Under the assumption that the communication in a WSN is not between
arbitrary nodes but more like a tree aggregation towards a sink, the key
distribution approach presented in [159] can be used to securely establish
keys.
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4.6 Broadcast Authentication
In order to allow only legitimate entities to query the sensor network for
data, the sensor nodes should be able to verify the legitimacy of the queries
introduced into the network. Therefore, a legitimate sender should append
some non-forgeable authentication information (called the authenticator in
the following) to its queries.
Precisely this feature offer broadcast authentication protocols. The au-
thentication of of broadcast messages is an essential subject in sensor net-
works and a core of the access control solutions presented in this thesis.
Therefore, we present existing broadcast authentication solutions in some
depth here. We concentrate on solutions that are resilient to node compro-
mise, i.e., to the reprogramming adversary (see Section 2.5.3).
4.6.1 Desirable Properties for Broadcast Authentication
We firstly present some properties that a broadcast authentication protocol
should satisfy in order to be most useful for access control.
Broadcast authentication in sensor networks should have low computa-
tion overhead, preferably, in order of milliseconds. The authenticator size
should not exceed the size of some dozen of bytes, that is, low communi-
cation overhead is required. Moreover, robustness to packet loss is a very
desirable property for unreliable wireless communication. This means that
the authenticator of the current message should not depend on the previ-
ous or future messages. Sending messages at irregular times should also be
possible, such that the scheme does not depend on periodical transmission
of some information. Finally, immediate message authentication is a very
desirable property. This means that the messages can be authenticated im-
mediately after the reception, and do not have to be disseminated in the
whole network before the authenticator can be verified.
Apart from the above properties introduced by Luk et al. [100], another
desirable property for broadcast authentication schemes is the ability to au-
thenticate unbounded number of messages after the initialization. Periodical
re-initialization required in the broadcast authentication schemes is usually
quite cumbersome and resources
In the following, we present existing schemes for broadcast authentica-
tion. We note that none of these schemes satisfies all desirable properties
mentioned above.
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4.6.2 Broadcast Authentication using Time Synchronization
The first method to authenticate broadcasts in sensor networks, a protocol
called µTESLA, is presented by Perrig et al. [118]. As µTESLA is one
of the most efficient broadcast authentication mechanisms for WSNs, its
performance is a good reference value and will be used for comparison to
the protocols developed in this thesis. Therefore, below we present µTESLA
in some depth.
The basic idea of this protocol is that messages are authenticated with a
secret key that is revealed in a later time interval. This approach manages
the task of broadcast authentication with just one message authentication
code (MAC) per message. In return it requires all receivers (all sensor nodes
in the network) to be loosely time synchronized, i.e., they must agree on the
current time up to a small error.
The sender splits up the time into uniform intervals i0 to iN . Next, it
generates a random key, kN , for the interval iN . By repeatedly applying
a one-way hash function F to kN the sender derives the keys for earlier
intervals. That is to say, F (kN ) is the key for interval iN−1, F 2(kN ) the key
for interval iN−2, and so on. The idea is to use the key from the current
period to authenticate broadcast messages, but to reveal the secret key in a
later period, e.g., two periods later.
For a message broadcast in interval i, the sender attaches a MAC to
this message, computed with the key from the current time interval. Sensor
nodes receiving this message first check whether the key used to authenticate
this message is still secret. If so, the nodes buffer this message for later
verification. When the sender discloses the secret key in interval i + 2, the
sensor nodes first verify the key by applying F to this key, i.e. by computing
F (ki). If the result of this application equals the key from the last interval,
namely ki−1 that was already authenticated, the receiver knows that the key
is correct. After this, the key can be used to verify the authenticity of the
buffered messages from interval i. Figure 4.1 illustrates this example.
µTESLA is a very efficient protocol, as it only requires transmission and
verification of one MAC per message, and additionally transmission of one
hash value per time interval. Moreover, it tolerates the packet loss.
We note that secure time synchronization incurs additional computation
and communication cost [61, 131]. Precise analysis of the impact of time
synchronization protocols on the sensor network is out of scope of this thesis.
It is clear, however, that in every such protocol the neighboring nodes have
to periodically exchange authentic messages with each other. Therefore, in
cases where no global time synchronization is needed in the sensor network,
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ki−1
F (ki)←−−− ki F (ki+1)←−−−−− ki+1 F (ki+2)←−−−−− ki+2 F (ki+3)←−−−−−
Interval i− 1 Interval i Interval i+ 1 Interval i+ 2
send msg verify msg
Figure 4.1: µTESLA example. In this example the key is revealed two
periods after the message was sent.
µTESLA may perform less efficiently than other solutions that have larger
authenticator size but do not require time synchronization.
µTESLA can be extended to provide authentication for messages sent
infrequently at irregular intervals [100]. The approach uses a combination
of hash trees and hash chains and reduces the verification overhead at the
cost of increased authenticator size (around 80 bytes). µTESLA was further
developed to scale to the multiple senders [98].
µTESLA requires periodical re-initialization, as the commitments to the
key chains have to be distributed periodically. In the original protocol this
is done using individual keys shared by the base station with each sensor
node. Even if this process can be made more efficient [96], the issue of the
re-initialization still remains.
The most severe disadvantage of µTESLA is the delayed message au-
thentication. This opens way to the DoS attack where the adversary sends
a lot of bogus messages in some time interval T . As the nodes do not have
any possibility to verify the authenticity of the messages, the fake messages
spread over the whole network thus exhausting energy.
4.6.3 Broadcast Authentication using Public-Key
Cryptography
Digital signatures provide immediate message authentication, does not re-
quire time synchronization, and has a moderate communication overhead of
around 40 bytes, if elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is used [70].
Unfortunately, it introduces high computation overhead and high delay
of about one second at each node. Clearly, digital signatures cannot be used
for time-critical applications. Moreover, if the query has to travel tens of
hops, the users may well get impatient till they receive the answer.
For example, Ren et al. [123] present a variety of schemes for broadcast
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authentication based on public key cryptography. All schemes allow the
participation of multiple and possibly mobile users to query the WSN. A
base station is considered a trusted third party. In the simplest approach,
for example, the base station serves as certification authority.
Yoon et al. [153] combine µTESLA and public-key cryptography. They
divide the network into clusters (cells) of n nodes, each cluster can withstand
t compromised nodes. The security of the scheme relies on a tamper-proof
master node that has to be present in each cell.
As digital signatures require quite a lot of energy for verification, an ad-
versary can run a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against individual nodes by
sending to them fake messages. The nodes would have to perform expensive
signature verification and would thus exhaust their energy. Dong et al. [51]
present a method to thwart this attack by using pre-authentication filters.
Another work that prevents DoS attacks on broadcast authentication
schemes [144] uses a set of strategies where the sensor nodes decide whether
they should forward a message without authenticator verification, or they
should verify the authenticator first. The scheme adapts flexibly to the
severity of the attack. In this way, broadcast delay is reduced in case most
of the messages are authentic. On the other hand, in case of a severe attack,
the impact of fake messages is reduced to a small part of the network.
4.6.4 Broadcast Authentication using Symmetric-Key
Cryptography
As already mentioned, public-key methods for broadcast authentication in-
troduce high delay and computation overhead. On the other hand, some
kind of asymmetric knowledge should be used for broadcast authentica-
tion [31] analogous to the public versus private keys in the digital signature
schemes.
As we described previously, µTESLA uses time to create asymmetry.
This enables the usage of the efficient symmetric-key cryptography. Some
other schemes try to avoid time synchronization.
Canetti et al. [35] describe a protocol for broadcast authentication in the
Internet. The sender in their setting knows a large number of symmetric keys
and uses all of them to compute MACs for a message. Each receiver knows
a predefined subset of sender’s keys and verify all corresponding MACs.
The probability for each receiver to accept a fake message can be made
sufficiently small by tuning the parameters. However, the most efficient
scheme still uses authenticator size of around 100 bytes, which is too large
for sensor networks. In Chapter 6 we use this scheme to develop a more
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efficient broadcast authentication protocol.
The paper on n-layer authentication in sensor networks (n-LQA) [124]
introduces a broadcast authentication scheme that is based on interleaved
authentication [139,157]. The authors suggest to divide a network in several
concentric rings around the base station, where each ring is assigned its own
key. Messages contain authentication information for the next t rings and are
only forwarded outwards. This approach guarantees that any injected query
will be filtered out unless more than t nodes are compromised. Moreover, it
also restricts the area in which the fake query spreads even if more than t
nodes are compromised.
Another approach is to use one time signatures [39]. However, these
schemes suffer from large storage overhead and have authenticator size of
hundreds of bytes.
Finally, a scheme for tree-based networks was introduced recently [36].
The base station shares symmetric keys with each node, and the topological
structure of the network is assumed to be static. This scheme constructs
a hash tree [107] using the MACs on the broadcast message as the values
assigned to the leaves of the tree. The values of all intermediate nodes in
the hash tree are computed by concatenating the values of the children and
hashing the concatenation. The broadcast message is sent into the network,
accompanied by the root of the hash tree. Subsequently, the nodes cooperate
in order to verify the authenticity of the message. This scheme induces
moderate communication overhead of O(log n) where n is the number of
nodes in the WSN and does not require time synchronization. Unfortunately,
it does not provide immediate message authentication.
4.7 Secure Code Update
Secure code update is a variant of broadcast authentication where the data
to be authenticated is a new program to be installed on the sensor nodes.
This means that the data to be authenticated is known beforehand, and
therefore, the full authentication information can be computed before the
data broadcast. Moreover, as code update is not a frequent operation, its
efficiency is not so critical as the efficiency of query dissemination techniques.
Code update is less relevant for this thesis, as we consider authentication of
an potentially unbounded number of user’s queries, and the content of the
queries is not known beforehand.
In the last years, a large number of schemes for authenticated code up-
date emerged, most of them securing the popular code update tool Del-
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uge [78]. In Deluge, the code divided into pages, the pages are divided into
packets, and the packets are then distributed into the network. All propos-
als apply either hash chains [54,86,93], or hash trees [80], or a combination
of the both techniques [45,91] to the pages and/or to the packets to achieve
code authentication. The authentication overhead is of the order of 20 to
400 bytes per page.
In the SCUBA system [125], code updates can not only be used to up-
grade sensor nodes, but also to detect and possibly to patch compromised
or malfunctioning nodes. The basic idea of this approach is to establish a
trusted code base on the sensor node. With this environment created, the
base station can determine whether a node has executed a code update cor-
rectly or not. In the former case the malicious code is simply overwritten,
whereas in the latter case the node can be blacklisted and excluded from
the network.
4.8 Authenticated Reports
The authentication of reports sent by sensor nodes to the user is a very im-
portant research direction. It is complementary to one aspect of the access
control problem investigated in this thesis. Access control seeks to prevent
unauthorized data access, resulting in the requirement that all queries be au-
thenticated. Any security architecture for sensor network should implement
authentication for both queries and reports. Therefore, it is important to
know the existing solutions in order to verify whether they can be combined
with the protocols for query authentication.
The interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme presented in [157] pro-
poses an approach based on multi-hop authentication. Here each node es-
tablishes a pairwise key not only with the base station, but also with some
of its up- and downstream neighbors. This scheme is also further described
later (see Section 5.2.2), as it serves as basis for the authenticated querying
scheme developed in Chapter 5.
The canvas scheme [139] is very similar to the interleaved hop-by-hop
authentication scheme. The main difference between both schemes is that
the canvas approach generates and sends significantly more MACs, resulting
in much larger messages and a higher energy consumption, but also an earlier
discovery of bogus messages. Because of high resource requirements, this
scheme is less practical for access control and is therefore not considered in
the sequel.
Statistical en-route filtering, as introduced in [151], provides a method
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to filter out false reports on the path to the base station with a certain
probability. Like in authenticated query flooding which is introduced in this
work (see Chapter 6), all nodes are assigned a subset of a global key pool
and can detect the false report with certain probability. Moreover, the base
station can accurately detect false reports even if they could not be filtered
out before because every node also shares its own pairwise key with the base
station.
4.9 Authenticated Aggregation
To save energy, reports in sensor networks are often aggregated. For ex-
ample, computing the average or the maximum of the sensor readings at
intermediate nodes during the data transport to the base station requires
significantly less bandwidth than transmitting all individual values to the
base station and then computing the required aggregates. As communi-
cation requires orders of magnitude more energy than computation, data
aggregation is a very important part of sensor network design.
Authentication of aggregated data is one of the most difficult problems,
as any malicious intermediate aggregating node can change the aggregated
data. Thus, the authenticated aggregation protocols should enforce correct
data aggregation, or at least detect the data manipulation.
The first secure aggregation protocol for sensor networks, called SIA
[120], employs random sampling mechanisms and interactive proofs. It
considers an aggregator node that aggregates the values of multiple sensor
nodes. The user can verify that the aggregation value is a good approxima-
tion of the true value even in presence of compromised nodes, including the
aggregator node.
The ESAWN protocol [30] uses witnesses for the verification of the aggre-
gate authenticity. The aggregation happens along an aggregation tree. The
witnesses receive the aggregated values as well as the original values, and can
therefore verify and confirm the correctness of the aggregation. The user can
trade the energy consumption of the verification off against the probability
of receiving a faked aggregation value by choosing to verify the aggregation
result with some probability p. Thus, ESAWN offers probabilistic aggregate
authenticity. In Chapter 6 we present a broadcast authentication protocol
that also offers probabilistic security and was developed independently and
concurrently to ESAWN.
Finally, Chan et al. [38] present secure hierarchical aggregation. The
hierarchical aggregation uses an aggregation tree as a network structure
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where the nodes jointly compute a commitment to the aggregated values.
The base station then verifies this commitment. The communication over-
head of this scheme is logarithmic in the network size [60]. As we described
in Section 4.6, the hierarchical aggregation scheme can be used to construct
a scheme for efficient broadcast authentication [36].
4.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present background information on sensor network ar-
chitecture and access control, and also related work in the area of sensor
network security, such as key establishment, broadcast authentication and
report authentication. In the two next chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) we de-
velop schemes for broadcast authentication and utilize them in access control
procedures. The developed schemes use some of the presented related work,
especially the work on key establishment and report authentication. The
used related work schemes are presented in more detail in the corresponding
chapters.
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Chapter 5
t-Robust Access Control in
WSNs
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present access control protocols that are able to withstand
capture of up to t sensor nodes. We call these protocols t-robust. The
protocols are fully secure as long as not more than t nodes are compromised,
but their security breaks completely in case the number of captured nodes
is t+ 1.
We firstly present a t-robust scheme for authenticated querying, and then
consider how to utilize it for t-robust access control.
The developed t-robust solution for authenticated querying has some
benefits over other solutions to broadcast authentication presented in Sec-
tion 4.6. It does not require time synchronization, provides immediate au-
thentication, and can authenticate an unbounded number of messages. It
has a low computation overhead, as it uses symmetric-key cryptography, and
every node has to compute only two MACs (message authentication codes)
per message.
However, there are also some disadvantages. The threshold t is hard to
estimate. Would t = 10 suffice? How can we guarantee that the adversary
would not compromise 11 nodes? Moreover, the communication overhead
of the solution grows exponentially in t. This means that large values of t,
e.g., t = 20, are not practical. Furthermore, the developed scheme requires
topological information, as every node has to know at least some of its
(t+ 1)-hop neighbors.
The experience gained during the development of t-robust authenticated
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querying shows that for small values of t, the scheme is quite attractive
due to the above mentioned advantages. However, for larger values of t,
the above disadvantages become severe. Therefore, we developed another
scheme that is more suitable for large numbers of compromised nodes, but
has probabilistic security guarantees. This scheme is presented in Chapter 6.
This chapter is organized as follows. We firstly discuss related work in
Section 5.2 and refine our general system and adversary models (Section 3.2)
for the needs of the current chapter in Section 5.3. We then develop and
analyze t-robust algorithms for authenticated querying in Section 5.4, and
show how to organize t-robust access control in Section 5.5. We conclude in
Section 5.6.
5.2 Preliminaries
To our knowledge, the framework presented in this paper is the first approach
to build access control for WSNs which can fully withstand capture of up
to t nodes (t-robust access control).
However, there are t-robust solutions in other areas of the WSN security,
such as pairwise key establishment [53,97] and interleaved report authentica-
tion [139,157]. We present some of these schemes in depth in Sections 5.2.1
and 5.2.2, as our solution for authenticated querying is based on them.
Finally, the n-LQA protocol [124] presents a t-robust solution to broad-
cast authentication that is also based on interleaved authentication and was
developed independently and concurrently to our work. In this protocol, the
network is organized into concentric layers, the nodes of the ith layer being
i hops away from the base station. However, in contrast to our solution,
n-LQA cannot be used in decentralized access control. The query in n-LQA
always has to start at the base station.
The notion of t-robustness has similarities to work in the area of fault-
tolerant and secure data replication. For example, Rabin [121] adapts secret
sharing techniques from the area of cryptography to make information avail-
able and keep it secure even if up to a certain fraction of nodes behave arbi-
trarily. As another example, Herlihy and Tygar [73] modify a fault-tolerant
replication protocol with secret sharing to maintain the confidentiality of
data in a similar setting. However, both papers do not focus on access
control.
In the following we present the detailed description of the most relevant
for this chapter related work.
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5.2.1 Polynomial-based Key Pre-distribution
All schemes considered in the following require that any two nodes can
establish a pairwise key with each other. There are several techniques to
pre-distribute or establish pairwise keys in wireless sensor networks.
The paper on polynomial-based key pre-distribution [95], for instance,
presents two suitable approaches. Particularly the grid-based key pre-distribution
seems to be very promising, since it requires neither much storage nor com-
munication. The basic idea of this approach is as follows:
For n nodes a virtual m ∗m grid is constructed (where m = √n). The
base station or a server generates 2m bivariate polynomials
{f ci (x, y), f ri (x, y)}i=0,...,m−1.
In this context, c stands for a column and r for a row in the grid. Each
polynomial is of the form
f(x, y) =
t∑
i,j
aijx
iyj .
Note that the sensor nodes do not have to generate these polynomials
on their own. This would be far too expensive in terms of time and energy
consumption. A base station, however, is provided with sufficiently large
resources to manage this task.
Every node is assigned a unique intersection in the grid, i.e. a position.
The node at position < i, j > is informed about its own position and the
polynomial shares of f ci (x, y) and f
r
j (x, y) by the base station. The polyno-
mial share of a polynomial f(x, y) for node A is f(A, y). Provided with this
knowledge, two nodes A and B can compute a common key f(A,B). Node
A evaluates f(A, y) at position B and node B evaluates f(B, y) at position
A, resulting in f(B,A) = f(A,B) (since f is bivariate). In the grid scheme,
two nodes at positions < i, j > and < i′, j′ > can directly establish a pair-
wise key if they are in the same column (i = i′) or the same row (j = j′).
Otherwise there must be a node at either < i, j′ >, < i′, j > or both which
can be used as mediator to establish a key.
This scheme can tolerate up to t compromised nodes where t is the degree
of the polynomials. Even if the t compromised nodes colluded, they would
know nothing about the pairwise key between any two non-compromised
nodes.
Another benefit of this approach is the storage requirements. Each node
has to store only two polynomials and its own position, instead of a single
key for each node it needs to communicate with.
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5.2.2 Interleaved Hop-by-Hop Authentication
The interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme [157] provides t-robust
authentication for messages sent to the base station along a predefined route.
It assumes a large-scale sensor network which is organised in clusters. Large-
scale means that there are in average several hops to pass from the centre of
a cluster to the base station. Each cluster consist of at least t+1 nodes and
one of them is considered cluster head. Moreover, each cluster is assigned a
unique cluster id by the base station.
All sensor nodes share a unique secret key with the base station. In
addition, they need to know at least a subset of their 1-hop neighbors and
must be able to establish a pairwise key with each of them. The authors
suggest LEAP [156] for this task.
Nodes should also be able to establish pairwise keys with other nodes
which are several hops away if needed. For this purpose, polynomial-based
key pre-distribution [95] described in the previous section can be used.
Interleaved hop-by-hop authentication tolerates up to t compromised
nodes, even if they can collude. This scheme guarantees that the base station
will detect any injected false data packets when no more than t nodes are
compromised. Furthermore, it also makes it possible to filter out false data
packets on their way to the base station. In the worst case, such a false
packet is forwarded O(t2) hops.
The basic idea of the scheme is as follows. In the first phase, each node
needs to discover its up- and downstream neighbors which are t + 1 hops
away. When the nodes of a cluster receive a stimulus, i.e. they observe
an event, they create two MACs over this event: One using the pairwise
key with one of their upstream neighbors and one using their pairwise key
shared with the base station.
The t+1 cluster members compute MACs for the first t+1 nodes along
a predefined path to the base station. The cluster head collects the values
from the t + 1 cluster nodes (including its own). If all t + 1 cluster nodes
agree on the report, i.e. they send the same values, the cluster head sends
the result to the base station.
For each node on the path from the cluster head to the base station,
there exists a downstream node which generated a MAC for it. This node is
either a cluster member (if the considered node is less than t+1 hops away
from the cluster), or the downstream t + 1-hops neighbor. When a report
arrives at such an en-route node, it checks the MAC which was calculated
for it.
If the node is able to verify the MAC, it removes it, generates its own
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MAC using the pairwise key with its upstream t + 1-hops neighbor on the
path (if there exists one) and appends it to the report. Thus, every node
verifies one MAC. If a MAC cannot be verified, the report is discarded and
not forwarded further. Each message is in this case accompanied by 2·(t+1)
MACs.
Note that accurate information on the up- and downstream neighbors
is crucial to this scheme. To provide a node with this kind of knowledge,
one must assume that routing paths do not change between the neighbor
discovery phase and the actual sending of the report, which is a strong
assumption for sensor networks.
At last, the base station checks the t + 1 MACs which were generated
by the cluster nodes. Thus, the base station can accurately detect any false
report, even if this report could not be filtered out before.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a simplified version of this scheme for t = 1, where
node 0 does not collect the MACs for its upstream neighbors, but generates
them on its own. Moreover, the source does not add MACs for the sink.
Here, node 0 wants to send a message to node 4.
A rigorous security analysis of interleaved hop-by-hop authentication can
be found in the original paper [157]. Informally considered, to compute a
fake report, the adversary would have to compromise an entire cluster, i.e.,
all t+ 1 cluster members.
However, the adversary can also try to change a legitimate report on its
way to the base station. Consider a legitimate report r1. The adversary
wants to change it into r2. The nodes compute MACs for their t + 1-hop
neighbors, and no intermediate node can verify the correctness of the MACs.
Thus, if the one compromised node was to compute its MAC for r2 instead
on r1, and there was a compromised node t+1 hops away, then the forgery
would go unnoticed.
From this observation follows that if the adversary compromises t + 1
nodes on the considered path such that the distance in hops between every
two consecutive compromised nodes is not more than t, then the adversary
can successfully change the report. Moreover, if the adversary compromised
t′ ≤ t nodes, it can make a fake report travel t′(t + 1) hops before it is
discovered. Thus, a fake report travels at most O(t2) hops. However, the
fake report would be discovered at the base station in any case, as the nodes
on the path cannot change the MACs which were computed on r1 by the
cluster members.
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the interleaved hop-by-hop scheme for t = 1. The full arrows
represent sent messages whereas the dashed arrows indicate for which nodes
MACs are generated.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the interleaved hop-by-hop scheme for t = 1. The
full arrows represent sent messages whereas the dashed arrows indicate for
which nodes MACs are generated.
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5.3 System and Adversary Model
The generic system and adversary models were specified in Section 3.2. As
presented there, we consider a large sensor network with a large number of
users. The users can send queries to the network.
We consider an adversary with the goal of sending arbitrary queries to
the network. The adversary can capture up to t sensor nodes, where t is
the system parameter. We do not make any assumptions concerning the
distribution of the captured nodes over the network.
That is, for a particular algorithm we always consider the worst case
distribution. For example, all the captured nodes may be close to each other.
On the other hand, the captured nodes may be distributed over the whole
network according to some strategy. Moreover, the adversary can analyze
network traffic in order to determine which nodes should be compromised.
As stated in Section 3.2, this results in the following adversary, with the
number of captured nodes being at most t:
{A1(global, eavesdrop),A2(distributed, reprogramming)}
Schemes presented in this chapter require an initialization phase where
each node has to discover some of its x-hop neighbors for x ≤ t + 1, i.e.,
some specific nodes that are (t + 1) or less hops away from it. We assume
that the attacker is not present during the initialization phase, and thus the
neighbor discovery does not need to be secure. Secure neighbor discovery is
an important and challenging problem, but it is out of scope of this work.
5.4 Interleaved Authenticated Querying
5.4.1 Introduction
In this section we present two t-robust schemes for authenticated query-
ing and analyze their security and efficiency. Subsequently we discuss in
Section 5.5 how to organize access control using the presented algorithms.
Both introduced schemes are based on the interleaved hop-by-hop au-
thentication scheme [157] which is described in Section 5.2.2. The schemes
have basically the same structure. Firstly, the base station and all sensor
nodes have to be initialised. This includes gathering information about the
neighborhood and establishing pairwise keys with other nodes. Secondly, the
base station posts queries to the network and authenticates these queries.
Sensor nodes which receive a query verify the corresponding authenticator
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and modify it, i.e. they remove obsolete MACs, and add new ones. Finally,
the sensor nodes forward both, the query and its authenticator.
The interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme was designed for point-
to-point communication along a predefined path. The basic idea is that each
node generates a MAC for its t+1-hop upstream neighbor on the path. The
nodes along the path verify and remove the MACs when they receive the
message, and add new MACs for their own t+ 1-hop upstream neighbors.
The first introduced scheme, called basic interleaved authenticated query-
ing (see Section 5.4.2) is a straightforward extension of the interleaved hop-
by-hop authentication scheme and in Section 5.4.3 is shown to be insecure
and prohibitively expensive in terms of the authenticator size. Nevertheless,
we present this scheme here for didactical reasons.
The second scheme, called tree-based interleaved authenticated querying,
is much more practical than the basic one, and can successfully withstand
the capture of up to t nodes.
The goal of authenticated querying is to flood the whole network with
the query. As networks are unlikely to be a linear alignment of nodes, the
messages have to spread in several directions. This means that each node
has to add MACs not only for its upstream neighbor in one direction but
in all possible directions. This dramatically increases either the number of
messages which are sent or the size of the authentication information added
to a message.
To illustrate this, consider a network with a uniform node distribution
where the average number of (t+ 1)-hop neighbors is n. If a node wants to
communicate with another node using the hop-by-hop scheme, the number
of MACs in one message is t+1 ∈ O(t) because each node appends one MAC
for its (t+ 1)-hop upstream neighbor to the message, and deletes the MAC
from its (t+1)-hop downstream neighbor. When using the same scheme for
broadcast, the number of MACs becomes n ∗ (t + 1), since each node has
to append one MAC for each of its (t + 1)-hop neighbors. Note that when
t increases, n increases as well. Thus, n can also be seen as a function of t
which means that n ∗ (t+ 1) would be more likely in O(t2). This leads to a
rapidly increasing message size resulting in high transmission costs.
5.4.2 Basic Interleaved Authenticated Querying
We consider a straightforward application of interleaved hop-by-hop authen-
tication to authenticated querying. Roughly speaking, instead of generating
a single MAC for its upstream (t+1)-hop neighbor on the path to the base
station, each node now generates MACs for all of its (t+ 1)-hop neighbors.
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That is to say, not only a single path is considered but all possible ones.
The (t+1)-hop neighbors of a node are all nodes which are exactly t+1
hops away, i.e., which can be reached in t+ 1 steps but not in fewer.
Note that the node will still have to verify only one MAC, as the received
query will arrive on a particular path where there is only one t + 1-hop
neighbor for the verifying node. However, the verifying node will have to
remove all other MACs generated by this neighbor.
During the initialization phase the base station has to discover all nodes
it can reach within t + 1 hops. For all these nodes it will have to generate
MACs and append them to the query. Thus, the base station also has
to establish pairwise keys with all these nodes. Note that many schemes
assume that the base station establishes keys with all sensor nodes which is
not necessary here.
Sensor nodes have to discover their (t + 1)-hop neighbors, as they will
have to generate MACs for them. Therefore, they have to establish a
pairwise key with each of these neighbors using, e.g., the polynomial key-
predistribution scheme described in Section 5.2.1. Moreover, the MAC on
the query which the nodes will have to verify will also be generated either
by one their (t + 1)-hop neighbors or by the base station, in case the node
is not more than t+ 1 hops away from it.
Both, base station and sensor nodes, store the discovered neighbors in a
list referred to as ownneighbors.
The sensor nodes also have to discover some additional neighbors. To
illustrate why, imagine node B receives an authenticator. Such an authen-
ticator contains the IDs of the nodes which generated the MACs, and the
MACs themselves. Let A be the first of these nodes. Then, according to the
considered schemes, A is a t + 1-hop neighbor of B and it has generated a
MAC for B. All MACs generated by A can be removed after the MAC for
B was verified, as B would forward the message to nodes that are t+2-hop
neighbors of A and in consequence, cannot do anything with MACs gener-
ated by A. Thus, node B has to discover the IDs of the nodes for which A
generated MACs in order to remove these MACs. Alternatively, each MAC
can be accompanied by two node IDs: the node that generated the MAC,
and the node for which the MAC is destined. This makes the messages even
more bulky, however, so we consider the topology-based approach instead.
Here two cases can be distinguished. Let d be the distance (measured
in hops) between B and the base station. If d is less than or equal to t+ 1,
every query which reaches B is authenticated by the base station, since the
base station generates the MACs which are used to authenticate the query
within the first t+1 hops. In this case it suffices for B to discover all nodes
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which have the same distance to the base station as itself, i.e. which are d
hops away from the base station. These are the nodes for which the MACs
generated by the base station are in the same part of the authenticator. B
needs to know these nodes in order to locate the MAC intended for itself,
and to remove the remaining MACs. Figure 5.2(a) illustrates this case. Here
the dashed line represents the hop on which the discovered neighbors are.
4.5 Schemes with a base station
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(a) Case 1: d <= t + 1
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(b) Case 2: d > t + 1
Figure 4.1: Neighbourhood discover (neighboursOf ). The dashed line represents the hop
on which the discovered neighbours are.
Algorithm 4.5.3: Initialise (Base Station; Simple Scheme)
data: ownNeighbours← discover 1, 2, ..., (t + 1)-hop neighbours;
foreach node ∈ ownNeighbours do
establish a pairwise key with node;
An authenticator consists of the following components. First, it contains the qid to en-
sure that a node which receives this authenticator can associate it with the corresponding
query. Second, it contains an array of node IDs referred to as nids in the following. This
array comprises t+1 node IDs indicating which t+1 nodes generated the MACs included
in the authenticator. Finally, the authenticator also contains the MACs generated by
the nodes mentioned in nids. This structure is illustrated by Figure 4.2.
When the base station poses a query, all entries in nids are set to the ID of the base
station because the base station generates all MACs for the first t+1 hops. See Algorithm
4.5.5 for the pseudo-code notation of this procedure.
When a node first receives a query, it stores this query and waits for the corresponding
authenticator before it processes and forwards the query (see Algorithm 4.5.6). When
an authenticator arrives first, the receiver waits for the corresponding query (see Algo-
rithm 4.5.7). As soon as both, query and authenticator, have arrived the receiving node
invokes HandleAuthenticator (see Algorithm 4.5.8). This function first checks if this
query was handled before. If so, the authenticator is discarded. The receiver also checks
qid nids[1] ... nids[t + 1] MACs from nids[1] ... MACs from nids[t + 1]
Figure 4.2: Structure of an authenticator.
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(b) Case 2: d > t+ 1
Figure 5.2: Discovery of additional nodes for the node B.
If B is more than t + 1 hops away from the base station, then each
query which reaches B is authenticated by one of B’s (t+1)-hop neighbors.
Let A be this neighbor (as before). B needs to know the other (t + 1)-
hop neighbors of A in order to locate the MAC destined for itself and to
remove all obsolete MACs from the authenticator. As B does not know from
which direction the query might arrive, it needs to discover all (t + 1)-hop
neighbors of all p s ible A’s, i.e., all of its w (t+1)-hop eighbors. These
neighbors are stored in an array of list of node ID , ref rred to as neighb rsOf
in the following. Figure 5.2(b) illustrates this second case. In this simple
example there is only one possible A. The pseudo-code notation for these
initialisation procedures are shown in Algorithm 5.4.1 and Algorithm 5.4.2.
Algorithm 5.4.1: Initialise (Base Statio ; Ba ic Scheme)
data: ownneighbors ← discover 1, 2, ..., (t+ 1)-hop neighbors;
foreach node ∈ ownneighbors do
establi h a pairwise ke with node;
Every query has a unique ide tifier, called query ID or qid. Each time a
query is post d o the network, the base station a to mpo e an authen-
ticator for this query.
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Algorithm 5.4.2: Initialise (Sensor Node; Basic Scheme)
data: ownneighbors ← discover (t+ 1)-hop neighbors;
data: d← distance to the base station;
foreach node ∈ ownneighbors do
establish a pairwise key with node;
switch d do
case d ≤ t+ 1 hops
data: neighborsOf [basestation]← discover d-hop neighbors of
the base station;
case d > t+ 1 hops
foreach node ∈ ownneighbors do
data: neighborsOf [node]← discover (t+ 1)-hop neighbors
of node;
qid nids[1] ... nids[t+ 1] MACs from nids[1] ... MACs from nids[t+ 1]
Figure 5.3: Structure of an authenticator.
An authenticator consists of the following components. Firstly, it con-
tains the qid. Secondly, it contains an array of node IDs referred to as nids
in the following. This array comprises t+1 node IDs indicating which t+1
nodes generated the MACs included in the authenticator. Finally, the au-
thenticator also contains the MACs generated by the nodes mentioned in
nids. This structure is illustrated by Figure 5.3.
When the base station posts a query, all entries in nids are set to the
ID of the base station because the base station generates all MACs for the
first t + 1 hops. See Algorithm 5.4.3 for the pseudo-code notation of this
procedure.
When a node first receives a query, it has to verify the authentica-
tor. To do this, it invokes the procedure HandleAuthenticator (see Al-
gorithm 5.4.4).
This procedure first checks if this query was handled before. If so, the
message is discarded. The receiver also checks whether all node IDs in the
array are either different or the ID of a base station. Without this check an
adversary would be able to fake a message with a single compromised node.
If this check yields a positive result, the receiving node reads the first field
of the nids array in the authenticator and looks up the neighbors for this
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Algorithm 5.4.3: StartQuery (Base Station; Basic Scheme)
input: a query with a unique identifier (qid)
/* an array containing t+1 node IDs */
data: nids;
/* a list of MACs */
data: macs;
set all fields in nids to the own ID;
foreach node ∈ ownneighbors do
generate MAC with pairwise key shared with node;
append this MAC to macs;
data: authenticator ← qid+ nids+macs;
broadcast query||authenticator;
node. Note that these neighbors were already discovered in the initialisation
phase.
For each of these neighbors there is a MAC in the authenticator destined
for it. The neighbors and the corresponding MACs are now processed one
after another. That is to say, the first MAC in macs is destined for the first
neighbor, the second MAC for the second neighbor and so on. If the cur-
rently considered neighbor has the same ID as the receiver, i.e., the current
MAC is intended for the receiving node, the node tries to verify this MAC
and removes it afterwards. Otherwise it just removes the MAC. If a MAC
could not be verified, the query is discarded and as it is marked as handled,
it will not be considered anymore. This procedure prevents an adversary
from performing reply attacks.
After the process of verifying and removing MACs is finished, the node
generates new MACs, one for each of its previously discovered t + 1-hop
neighbors, and appends these MACs to the authenticator. Since all MACs
which were generated by the first node in the nids array were removed and
additional MACs were added, nids has to be updated as well. By shifting
all entries in the array one field to the left the first entry is dropped and the
last entry becomes empty. This last entry has to be set to the node’s own
ID, i.e. to the ID of the node which has just processed the authenticator.
Finally, the query and the modified authenticator are broadcast into the
network. Here, we assume flooding as the method for query dissemination.
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Algorithm 5.4.4: HandleAuthenticator (Sensor Node; Basic Scheme)
input: query||authenticator
data: qid← authenticator.qid;
data: nids← authenticator.nids;
data: macs← authenticator.macs;
data: verified = FALSE;
if qid was handled before then
ignore the message;
else
mark qid as handled;
if values in nids are invalid then
discard query;
else
data: node← first entry in nids;
foreach x ∈ neighborsOf [node] do
if x = my ID then
verify the current MAC;
if this MAC could not be verified then
discard query;
else
verified = TRUE;
remove first MAC from macs;
if verified = FALSE then /* no MAC was verified */
discard query;
else /* a MAC could be verified */
foreach node ∈ ownneighbors do
generate MAC with pairwise key shared with node;
append this MAC to macs;
shift all entries in nids one field to the left;
set the last field of nids to the own ID;
data: authenticator ← qid+ nids+macs;
broadcast query||authenticator;
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5.4.3 Analysis of the Basic Interleaved Scheme
We now analyze security and performance of the basic t-robust authenticated
querying algorithm.
5.4.3.1 Security
The security analysis of hop-by-hop interleaved authentication [157] showed
that an adversary can forge a report en-route only if it captured more than t
nodes on a path, and if the distance (in hops) between every two consecutive
nodes is not more than t. Moreover, all reports which were faked en-route
will be detected at the latest at the base station. The only feasible way to
forge a report undetectably is to compromise a whole cluster (t + 1 nodes)
which can then fabricate a fake report.
In our scheme, if the adversary compromised t+1 nodes that lie consec-
utively on some path, the faked query can spread to almost all nodes that
are connected to any of the compromised nodes.
To see this, consider a shortest-path spanning tree rooted at an arbitrary
non-compromised node s. If there is a branch in this tree which contains
the compromised path, then the faked query will arrive to s via this path.
On the other hand, if only a part of the compromised path lies on a
branch of the spanning tree, the adversary has to tamper with the authen-
ticators. The node s will accept a query if one of its (t + 1)-hop neighbors
computed a MAC on it using their shared key. If there is a node q such
that q accepted the fake query, and q is a (t + 1)-hop neighbor of s, then
q generated a MAC for s as it forwarded the query to its neighbors. This
MAC can be used to convince s that the query is genuine. On the other
hand, if q does not exists, there is no possibility for the adversary to forge
a query for s.
Although there is no guarantee that for all nodes s there is such a node
q, this may be true in sufficiently large networks in many cases. The query
will firstly spread over all nodes which have the compromised path in their
shortest-path spanning trees. Then the adversary can analyze the messages
produced by non-compromised nodes which accepted the fake query, and
use the produced MACs.
To summarize, the impact of a faked query on the network is highly
topology dependent. In the worst case, the fake query can spread over the
whole network.
We illustrate the above reasoning using Figure 5.4. Here, t = 2 and
the path (2, 4, 10) is compromised. In the left picture, the non-compromised
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nodes 1, 3 and 11 have the compromised path in their shortest-path spanning
tree, so the fake query reach these nodes quite naturally. Then node 11
generates MACs for its 3-hop neighbors 5 and 8, such that the fake query
will be accepted by these nodes. Analogously, the query can spread to all
other nodes in the network.
In the right picture, none of the non-compromised nodes have the com-
promised path in their shortest-path spanning tree, and therefore, the fake
query cannot reach any of these nodes.
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(a) The fake query spreads to all nodes.
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(b) The fake query does not reach
any non-compromised node.
Figure 5.4: Impact of the compromised path (2, 4, 10) on the network, t = 2.
Now assume that the adversary controls tˆ < t + 1 nodes. An honest
node s accepts a query if there is a MAC computed by one of its (t+1)-hop
neighbors in the authenticator. Thus, if the query is fake, then either a
(t+1)-hop neighbor of s is compromised, or this neighbor accepted the fake
query previously. We now show that in certain circumstances even a couple
of compromised nodes can lead to a serious attack.
Consider Figure 5.5. Here, t = 2 and nodes 1 and 2 are compromised.
Node 1 shares secret keys with its 3-hop neighbors 3, 4 and 5. These neigh-
bors constitute a 3-hop path in the sensor network.
The attack runs as follows. Assume that the adversary wants to send an
arbitrary query q. The adversary constructs the authenticator for q using
the key shared between nodes 1 and 3. All other MACs in the authenticator
can be bogus. The adversary gives the faked query to node 2 which sends it
to node 3. Node 3 verifies the authenticator, i.e., it verifies the MAC com-
puted by node 1, and modifies the authenticator according to the algorithm.
Among other things, it computes MACs for nodes 6 and 7. The adversary
intercepts this authenticator using node 2 and stores the computed MACs
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Figure 5.5: Nodes 1 and 2 are captured, t = 2. The faked query can reach
non-compromised paths (6, 8, 11), (7, 9, 12) and (7, 10, 12) if the adversary
tampers with the authenticators generated by non-compromised nodes on
the path (3, 4, 5).
for future use.
Using the same technique, the adversary obtains MACs computed with
keys shared between nodes 4 and its 3-hop neighbors 8, 9, and 10, and
between 5 and its 3-hop neighbors 11 and 12.
In this way, the adversary can make t+ 1 consecutive nodes on at least
one path to accept the fake query. In the example, t + 1 = 3, and some of
the the paths are (6, 8, 11), (7, 9, 12) and (7, 10, 12). As we have seen above,
the fake query may spread over a considerable part of the network in this
case.
We conclude that the security of the above straightforward extension of
the interleaved hop-by-hop authentication method to authenticated querying
is highly dependent of the network topology. In the worst case, one or two
captured nodes can suffice for a very serious attack which makes a large part
of the network accept an arbitrary fake query. As in our system model we
do not make assumptions about network topology, we have to consider the
above scheme as highly insecure against node capture.
We note that the above attack can also be applied to the original scheme
[157] for report authentication in case the reports are sent to the base station
along overlapping paths. Thus, care should be taken when employing in-
terleaved hop-by-hop report authentication in large networks with multiple
reporting clusters.
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5.4.3.2 Performance
Although the scheme presented in the current section was shown to be in-
secure, we nevertheless analyze its performance in order to compare it to
more secure solutions presented further.
The above straightforward approach does not perform very well. The
main reason is the enormous size of the authenticators which have to be sent.
As this algorithm does not use any sense of direction, the authentication
information for all (t+ 1)-hop neighbors has to be sent to every node.
Let |nid|byte denote the storage required for a node ID. Then the nids
array consumes (t+ 1) ∗ |nid|byte bytes. Further, let |mac|byte be the size of
a MAC, and |qid|byte the size of a query ID. The number of MACs attached
by each node strongly depends on the underlying topology.
As an example, we assume a “diamond” grid as presented in Figure 5.6.
In this topology, the number of n-hop neighbors of an “inner” node is 6n. In
a large grid, each node has roughly the same number of (t+1)-hop neighbors
which is 6(t+ 1). This means that each node appends 6(t+ 1) MACs to an
authenticator. As the authenticator contains information from exactly t+1
nodes, the upper bound for the size of the authenticator in the basic scheme
is
authbasic = |qid|byte + (t+ 1) ∗ |nid|byte + (t+ 1) ∗ 6(t+ 1) ∗ |mac|byte
(5.1)
Assume the following sets of parameters:
 t = 2
 |qid|byte = 2
 |nid|byte = 2
 |mac|byte = 4
With these parameters each node would have to send 224 bytes of authen-
tication information:
authsimple = |qid|byte + (t+ 1) ∗ |nid|byte + (t+ 1)2 ∗ 6 ∗ |mac|byte
= 2 + 3 ∗ 2 + 9 ∗ 6 ∗ 4 = 224
However, packet size in sensor networks is usually assumed to be in order
of tens of bytes. Thus, apart from being insecure, the basic scheme is also
impractical. Therefore, in the next section we develop another scheme for
interleaving authenticated querying, and show further show that this scheme
is t-robust and its efficiency is optimal.
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Figure 5.6: Diamond grid topology.
5.4.4 Tree-based Interleaved Authenticated Querying
With an increasing message size the chance of successfully receiving this
message decreases. Thus, it would be nice to have shorter messages which
are sent into a certain direction. The idea is to use several unicast messages
which only contain the authentication information relevant to a restricted
area, instead of one large broadcast message that contains all information.
Figure 5.7 illustrates this approach.
The amount of data sent by the base station remains the same. In fact
it might even increase a bit since sending several messages involves a greater
communication overhead, caused by the transport protocol. Hence, there is
no improvement at the base station. Despite this fact, energy can be saved
in the whole network. The reason is that messages sent within a certain
area (as indicated by Figure 5.7(b)) are shorter than the broadcast message
in the basic scheme because they contain less information. More precisely,
messages in the broadcast scheme contain the complete information required
in all direction from the sender whereas each unicast message contains only
a small part of this information. Hence, all sensor nodes in this area have
to transfer less data. Besides this advantage, shorter messages also increase
the chances of receiving these messages. Therefore, the number of nodes
that can successfully authenticate a query should also increase.
Another drawback of the basic approach is that multiple MACs are gen-
erated for each node. This is because nodes do not keep track of the path
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(a) broadcast message (b) unicast message
Figure 5.7: Area for which the authentication information
is included in a message, the base station is located in the
middle of the grid.
a message has already travelled. Figure 5.8 shows an example for t = 1. In
this example node A generates MACs for all its 2-hop neighbours. First, B
receives the message sent by A, removes some MACs, and adds new ones
for its own 2-hop neighbours. Next, C receives the message, removes some
MACs, and appends new MACs for its 2-hop neighbours including a MAC
for A. But the authenticator from C will never reach A because A already
processed this message. Nevertheless, C will generate a MAC for A and so
will all of A’s 2-hop neighbours. Obviously this should be prevented. The
tree-based scheme presented in the following realizes the above ideas.
B
C
A
MAC CA= MACAC
Figure 5.8: Example for the redundant calculation of MACs in the basic
scheme. Here t = 1, node A generates a MAC for C, and C generates a
MAC for A.
In order to provide nodes with a sense of direction, nodes do not only
need to know which neighbours they have but also how they are connected to
these neighbours. This means that all nodes need some routing information.
The simplest approach to obtain this kind of information is to construct a
spanning tree of the network with the base station as root node. The base
station can now send a unicast message to each of its direct children. Each
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of these unicast messages contains the authentication information required
in this particular subtree, instead of the information for the whole tree as
before (see Figure 5.9).
(a) the whole spanning tree (b) a considered subtree
Figure 5.9: Spanning tree of a network with the base station
as root.
Algorithm 5.4.5 describes the initialisation phase for the base station.
First, a shortest-path spanning tree of the network is constructed and then
keys are established with all nodes on the first t + 1 layers of the tree, i.e.
with all nodes within the first t+ 1 hops from the base station.
Algorithm 5.4.5: Initialise (Base Station; Tree Scheme)
data: tree← discover a shortest-path spanning tree of the network;
establish pairwise keys with all nodes on the first (t+1) layers of tree;
Sensor nodes need to know a part of the spanning tree. Specifically, each
node needs to know the t+1 layers below the own position and its (t+1)st
predecessor. Note that other children of the predecessor are not required.
All other branches from the spanning tree can be pruned.
Depending on the used topology discovery protocol, this information
might be obtained during the construction of the spanning tree. If this is
not possible, sensor nodes can request the required part of the spanning tree
from the base station.
In the next step, each node has to establish pairwise keys with all nodes
on the (t+1)st layer below itself. During this process, each node would also
have automatically established pairwise keys with its (t + 1)st predecessor
in the tree. Algorithm 5.4.6 summarises this procedure.
When a query is started, the base station generates an authenticator
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Algorithm 5.4.6: Initialise (Sensor Node; Tree Scheme)
request the required subtree;
establish pairwise keys with all nodes which are exactly t+ 1 layers
below;
for each of its direct children. Each of these authenticators only contains
the authentication information required in the subtree beneath the selected
child. The base station generates MACs for each node in the subtree and
appends these MACs to the authenticator (see Algorithm 5.4.7). Note that
the nids array is not required in this scheme because each node has a well-
defined position in the tree and thus knows exactly which nodes processed
the authenticator before.
Algorithm 5.4.7: StartQuery (Base Station; Tree Scheme)
input: a query with a unique identifier (qid)
/* a list of MACs */
data: macs;
foreach direct child in the spanning tree do
consider the subtree below this child;
for n = 1 to t+1 do
foreach node on the n-th layer do
generate a MAC with the key shared with node;
append this MAC to macs;
data: authenticator ← qid+macs;
send authenticator||query to the currently considered direct child;
As in the basic scheme, the sensor node receiving a query firstly checks
the processing status of the query. If the query was already handled before,
then it is dropped. Otherwise, the query is marked as handled and the
authenticator is processed.
Unlike the basic scheme, sensor nodes do not have to look up the ID of
the node that generated the MACs in the nids array because they already
know which node generated the MACs. If a node is on one of the first t+ 1
layers of the tree, then the MAC destined for it was generated by the base
station. Otherwise, the MAC was generated by its (t + 1)st predecessor.
After verifying the MAC, the node generates new MACs for all nodes on
the (t+ 1)st layer below itself. These MACs are appended to the query.
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The difference is that the authenticator is not broadcast as a whole
but split up into several parts which are unicast. Each child gets its own
authenticator containing just the MACs required in the subtree below this
child. Algorithm 5.4.8 shows the routine for handling an incoming query.
Algorithm 5.4.8: HandleAuthenticator (Sensor Node; Tree Scheme)
input: a query and its authenticator
data: qid← authenticator.qid;
data: macs← authenticator.macs;
if qid was handled before then
ignore the message;
else
mark qid as handled;
verify the first MAC;
if this MAC could not be verified then
discard query;
else
foreach node ∈ ownNeighbours do
generate a MAC with the key shared with node;
append this MAC to macs;
foreach child ∈ children do
data: macs← select all MACs from the authenticator
required in the branch below child;
data: authenticator ← qid+macs;
send authenticator||query to child;
5.4.5 Analysis of the Tree-Based Scheme
5.4.5.1 Security
The insecurity of the first scheme presented in this chapter (see Section 5.4.3.1)
was based on the fact that the sensor nodes had a limited knowledge about
the query dissemination in the network. Therefore, the nodes accepted the
query as soon as it was authenticated by an arbitrary (t+ 1)-hop neighbor
of the node.
In the scheme presented in the current section, this is not the case. If the
adversary compromises t + 1 nodes that lie consecutively on a path in the
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spanning tree, then the last node on this path will be able to disseminate the
fake query in the subtree rooted at it. As in the previous case, the impact of
the fake query is highly topology-dependent. In particular, it depends very
much on the structure of the spanning tree rooted at the last node.
If the adversary compromised tˆ ≤ nodes, then the impact of the fake
query is localized to the corresponding tˆ-level subtree of the network’s span-
ning tree.
We now consider the denial-of-service (DoS) opportunities in the tree-
based scheme. Firstly, in our scheme the nodes blacklist queries that ar-
rive with an incorrect authenticator. Thus, if the adversary sends incorrect
queries with future query IDs, then the corresponding correct queries will
not be processed by the affected nodes. The impact of these queries is local-
ized, as the nodes do not forward the queries. However, this means that the
whole subtree rooted at the affected node will not receive the correct query.
it is not quite clear how to defend against this attack. Most probably, the
defense would require some methods that are outside of the protocol design,
such as an intrusion detection system [90].
We also note that the tree-based scheme is highly susceptible to node
crashes and link failures, that is, to the disturbing adversary. One failure
means that the whole subtree rooted at the attacked node cannot receive
the query. Appropriate countermeasures include monitoring of neighbors for
link and crash failures and local repair, such as assigning a new root to the
affected subtree. We are, however, unaware of any such protocols that work
in the presence of node captures.
5.4.5.2 Performance
As mentioned above, messages sent in the tree-based scheme are consid-
erably smaller than messages in the basic scheme. Shorter messages are
favourable because they consume less energy. Nevertheless, each node has
to send several messages in this scheme, one for each of its children to be
more specific. An increasing number of messages causes an extra communi-
cation overhead.
In order to compare the tree scheme with the basic scheme, one has to
estimate the number of MACs in each message. The number of MACs in
each message is exactly the number of nodes in a (t+1)-layered subtree of the
network’s spanning tree. Unfortunately, the average number of (t + 1)-hop
neighbors and the average degree of the spanning tree cannot be converted
into each other in a straightforward manner. The following paragraphs first
describe how one can achieve a rough approximation of the number of the
88 5 t-Robust Access Control in WSNs
MACs in the authenticator and then illustrates this result using a concrete
example.
Approximation. According to our algorithm, the network is organized
as a shortest-path spanning tree rooted at the base station. We assume
that each subtree rooted at the children of the base station is a tree where
each node has d children. Actually, such a tree does not exist in the most
cases, thus d should be considered as an approximation. For example, in
Figure 5.10 the children of the base station have 12 children, and these
have 18 children in the next layer. Thus, each node has on average d =
1
2
(
12
6 +
18
12
)
= 1.75 children.
Figure 5.10: Example of a spanning tree for the diamond grid.
To generalize the above reasoning, consider a network of diameter 2r (in
hops) organized in the diamond structure such as in Figure 5.10 with the
base station in the center. Then there are 6i nodes in the ith level of the
spanning tree which starts at the base station. The depth of the spanning
tree is r.
We compute the average number of node’s children in the spanning tree
as follows:
d =
1
r − 1
r−1∑
i=1
6(i+ 1)
6i
= 1 +
1
r − 1
r−1∑
i=1
1
i
(5.2)
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The average degree of the spanning tree goes to 1 with the growth of
the network diameter. This can actually be shown for any network with
uniformly distributed nodes.
We now consider how many MACs are included in the authenticator
of the tree-based scheme. The incoming message for each node contains a
MAC computed by its (t + 1)-hop predecessor, or by the base station, and
MACs for all nodes in the t-layer subtree rooted at the considered node.
The number of these MACs can therefore be computed as
t∑
i=0
di =
dt+1 − 1
d− 1 . (5.3)
Finally, the number of bytes in the authenticator can be computed as
authtree = |qid|byte + |mac|byte ∗ d
t+1 − 1
d− 1 . (5.4)
Example. We now compute the authenticator size for the tree scheme
using the same set of parameters as in Section 5.4.3.2 where we considered
the performance of the basic scheme. We consider a network organized as
a diamond grid similar to the grid in Figure 5.6 with the base station in
the middle and the diameter of 20 hops. The other parameters remain as in
Section 5.4.3.2:
 t = 2
 |qid|byte = 2
 |mac|byte = 4
This means that the distance between any node and the base station is
at most 10 hops. Then according to Formula 5.2 d = 1.3 and the number of
MACs in the authenticator is 4 on average according to Formula 5.3.
An authenticator message in the tree-based scheme does not contain any
node IDs, but just the query ID and the above number of MACs. Then an
authenticator contains approximately the following number of bytes:
authtree = |qid|byte + |mac|byte ∗ 4 = 16
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Thus, in the tree-based scheme the size of the authentication information
in this example is 16 bytes instead of 224 bytes in the basic scheme.
Actually, when using the interleaved hop-by-hop authentication to flood
a network, the tree-based scheme is the most efficient approach. The follow-
ing section argues why this scheme cannot be further improved.
5.4.6 Optimality of the Tree-Based Scheme.
In order to show that the tree-based scheme is indeed the most efficient one
for interleaved authentication, one needs to show three points:
1. no MAC is redundant
2. no path can be omitted
3. the data cannot be further aggregated
Regarding the first point: Every node appears only once in the spanning
tree. The base station generates one MAC for each node on the first t + 1
layers of this tree. Each following node generates one MAC for each of its
t+ 1 descendants. As the t+ 1 descendants are unique for each node, there
is exactly one MAC generated for each node. This means that if any MAC
was omitted, one node would not be able to authenticate the query. Hence,
no MAC is redundant.
Regarding the second point: In a spanning tree there is exactly one path
from the root to each descendant. Thus, not considering a path implies that
at least one node (and the whole subtree beneath this node) would not be
able to authenticate the query.
Regarding the third point: A query is authenticated along a path con-
sisting of at most t+1 steps or parts. If the root node would send a unique
authenticator to each of its descendants, some parts of these paths are used
several times. One can avoid this overhead by multiplexing all authenti-
cation information which uses the same first step into one message. After
the message has travelled one step, the information could be split up again
and all information which uses the same next step is put into a single mes-
sage. This way, each part of each path is authenticated only once and this
is exactly what the tree-based scheme does. The authentication information
cannot be further aggregated because the spanning tree consists of shortest
paths.
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5.4.7 Comparison to Related Work
We now consider the properties of the basic and the tree-based schemes for
interleaved authenticated querying.
As shown in Section 5.4.2, the basic scheme is insecure and inefficient.
However, the tree-based interleaved scheme presented subsequently is secure
in presence of up to t captured nodes and is much more efficient for the small
values of t, see Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.11: The number of bytes in the authenticator for the basic vs. tree-
based interleaved authenticated querying according to Formulas 5.1 and 5.4
depending on the maximal number of captured nodes t for the diamond grid
topology (Figure 5.6).
It can be seen that for t = 10, even the most efficient tree-based scheme
with the very small MAC size of 1 byte still requires the authenticator size of
more than 40 bytes. This authenticator size may still be affordable for sensor
networks, considering that the size of an ECC (elliptic curve cryptography)
digital signature is also around 40 bytes. We note, however, that the MAC
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size of 1 byte is considered insecure, and the size of at least 4 bytes is
recommended [106]. However, for this MAC size the authenticator gets
prohibitively large (around 170 bytes) even for the tree-based scheme.
Nevertheless, for the small values of t, the tree-based scheme can be used.
For example, for t = 3 the size of the authenticator is 18 bytes for 4-byte
MACs and 6 bytes for 1-byte MACs.
We now consider which goals of the broadcast authentication presented
in Section 4.6.1 on page 56 are satisfied or not satisfied by the tree-based
interleaved authenticated querying, and compare our scheme to related work
on broadcast authentication (see Section 4.6).
Our scheme incurs small computation overhead for small values of t in
uniformly distributed networks, as each node needs to verify only one MAC,
and to compute MACs for the nodes that are t+1 tree levels below them in
a tree with the average number of children going to 1 in networks of large
diameter. For example, if the average number of children is 1.3, then for
t = 3 each node computes 1.34 ≈ 3 MACs on average.
The communication overhead can be computed as the number of MACs
attached to the query. As we have shown above, the authenticator size for
t = 3 and d = 1.3 can vary from 6 to 18 bytes. This is quite acceptable
considering that the scheme does not require time synchronization, provides
immediate authentication, and can authenticate an unbounded number of
messages sent at irregular times after the first initialization. Thus, for small
values of t, our scheme compares favorably with the existing broadcast au-
thentication solutions.
We note that our scheme requires the maintenance of the spanning tree
with reliable links in the network and incurs in this sense additional costs
similar to these of n-LQA [124] and the authenticated broadcast schemes
based on hierarchical aggregation algorithms [36].
5.4.8 Summary
We investigated how to extend the scheme for interleaved hop-by-hop re-
port authentication [157] to be used for authenticated querying. The first
developed scheme (Section 5.4.2) was presented for didactical reasons, as it
turned out to be insecure and inefficient.
However, the tree-based interleaved scheme presented subsequently is
secure in presence of up to t captured nodes and exhibit desirable properties
for the small values of t.
In the next section we utilize the tree-based scheme for access control.
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5.5 t-Robust Access Control
5.5.1 t-Robust Access Control via Base Station
As described in Section 3.5.1, access control (AC) at the base station can
be organized in two phases:
1. The user logs in to the base station using conventional access control
methods.
2. The base station sends user’s query into the sensor network and au-
thenticates it using some method for authenticated querying.
In the direct AC, the user connects to the base station using some ex-
ternal network e.g., the Internet, or by directly approaching it with a user
device. In this case, t-robust access control at the base station can be or-
ganized in the straightforward manner. After the user logged into the base
station, user’s queries are authenticated by the base station using the tree-
based scheme for interleaved authenticated querying.
For the remote t-robust AC, the user is located in the sensor field and
uses the surrounding sensor nodes for remote communication with the base
station. In this case, the user has to authenticate itself to at least t + 1
sensor nodes. These nodes forward user’s queries to the base station using
the interleaved hop-by-hop report authentication [157]. The base station
then sends the queries into the network using the tree-based scheme for
authenticated querying.
We note that in order to use interleaved hop-by-hop report authentica-
tion, the network should be organized in clusters, and each cluster should
know a predefined path to the base station. In the tree-based scheme, the
nodes can use the path in the spanning tree from the cluster head to the
base station. In this case, each node in the cluster should be assigned a node
on the path (within the first t+ 1 hops) for which it generates the MAC on
the user’s query.
5.5.2 t-Robust Decentralized Access Control
In the previous section we considered t-robust authenticated querying via
the base station. We now consider how the tree-based scheme has to be
altered in order to authenticate user’s queries without the participation of
the base station.
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In the tree-based scheme the spanning tree was constructed by the base
station and rooted at it. In the decentralized access control the user can
appear everywhere in the network.
A straightforward solution would be to construct a new spanning tree
for each query with the user device as root. However, this is not a feasible
solution because discovering a spanning tree requires much communication.
Therefore, it is favourable to discover a spanning tree only once and use
this information for each query. This spanning tree should not contain user
devices or other mobile nodes because this would cause the tree to become
obsolete every time a device moves. In the following we assume that the
spanning tree is still generated by the base station and rooted at it.
However, in contrast to the previous tree-based scheme, each node does
not store the first t+1 layers of the subtree rooted at it, but t+1 layers of a
transformed spanning tree. The original spanning tree has to be transformed
by each node s in such a way that s becomes the root of the new spanning
tree. All nodes that are t + 1 or less hops away from the node s in the
original tree become its children in the transformed spanning tree.
An illustration of this transformation is shown in Figure 5.12. In this
example, the white node is the selected source node. Figure 5.12(a) shows
the original tree, Figure 5.12(b) an intermediate step and Figure 5.12(c) the
result of the transformation.
(a) original (b) intermediate step (c) revised
Figure 5.12: Transformation of the original spanning tree into a tree
with another root node.
Furthermore, just as in the case of remote access control via the base
station, we assume that the network is organized in (t + 1)-node clusters.
Similar to the interleaved authentication along a path, the nodes in the
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cluster should be able to authenticate messages for the first t + 1 layers of
the transformed spanning tree which begins at the cluster head. Each of the
t+1 nodes should be assigned one of the first t+1 levels in the transformed
spanning tree.
We now show how the transformed spanning tree is used for decentralized
access control. According to the general scheme presented in Section 3.5.2.1,
the user device logs in to the nodes of some cluster using public key cryptog-
raphy. After a successful login, these nodes compute the authenticator, and
the cluster head forwards user’s query using t-robust interleaved authenti-
cated querying along the transformed spanning tree.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigated t-robust access control in sensor network. We
extended the interleaved report authentication scheme to work as a t-robust
authenticated querying scheme. The straightforward extension turned out
to be insecure and to have very high resource requirements. However, a mod-
ification to the tree-based scheme showed to be t-robust and have moderate
resource requirements for small values of t.
We furthermore showed how to utilize the tree-based interleaved authen-
ticated querying scheme for access control.
According to our performance analysis, t-robust access control is very
resource intensive for large values of t. Especially the gathering and main-
taining of the required topological information seems to be an expensive
operation in this case.
Moreover, as the security breaks completely in case the adversary com-
promised more than t nodes, correct setting of the threshold t is very im-
portant for t-robust solutions. To be on the safe side, the value of t should
actually be in the order of tens of nodes. However, in this case the presented
scheme becomes prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, we showed that our
scheme is the most efficient of its kind.
Motivated by the experience in devising t-robust solutions for access con-
trol, in the next chapter we investigate the paradigm of gracefully degrading
probabilistic security for access control. In this paradigm, the security of the
schemes degrades gracefully with the increasing number of captured nodes.
This paradigm seems to be especially appropriate for sensor networks due
to uncertainty concerning the number of nodes the adversary is able to cap-
ture. Additional advantage is that the probabilistic solutions are often more
practical than the deterministic ones.
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Chapter 6
Gracefully Degrading Access
Control in WSNs
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we considered t-robust authenticated querying. This
method does not scale well, and requires the nodes to keep much state.
Moreover, it is highly susceptible to link and node failures.
Furthermore, the adversary model where the number t of captured nodes
is fixed beforehand and the security breaks completely after just one addi-
tional node capture, is difficult to justify. Indeed, if the adversary captured
5 nodes, there is actually no guarantee that it would not capture the 6th
node. The obvious solution setting t very high is not practical, because t-
robust schemes incur high communication and storage cost that grow rapidly
with t.
One of the most popular ways to overcome impossibility or inefficiency
of solutions in distributed systems is to make some of the protocol goals
probabilistic [13, 94].
Another popular paradigm is graceful degradation [9, 28, 50] where the
properties to achieved by the protocol depend on the power of the adver-
sary. For weaker adversaries, these protocols achieve better performance or
security than for stronger adversaries.
In this chapter, we present a novel probabilistic, gracefully degrading
approach to authenticated querying, and discuss how to utilize this approach
for access control.
The central idea of our approach is based on the fact that in general,
before the query reaches the nodes that are able to answer it, it passes
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through some significant part of the network. Thus, if some mechanism
allows the sensor nodes to verify the legitimacy of the query probabilistically,
illegitimate queries will be dropped before they can penetrate deeply into
the network and reach the target nodes.
Our protocol restricts the propagation of fake queries to a constant area
of the network, regardless of the network size. Some sensor nodes in our
protocol may fail to recognize a fake query. As long as their number is very
small, the effects of these false acceptances are negligible since other nodes
will detect the fake query and not forward it further. By tuning the protocol
parameters, our protocol also allows to trade off efficiency with security and
hence can be tuned for different application scenarios.
Our protocol uses only symmetric cryptography and is based on the in-
genious protocol by Canetti et al. [35], but it has a much better performance,
as it relies on the implicit cooperation between the sensor nodes that occurs
when the authenticated query is forwarded into the network.
6.2 Preliminaries
The resource constraints of sensor networks make them ideal candidates
to employ probabilistic protocols. Such protocols are usually much more
efficient than deterministic protocols at the price of ensuring the desired
protocol properties with high probability rather than always. Probabilis-
tic security protocols have been successfully employed in sensor networks
for key establishment [37, 55, 79], secure aggregation [30, 120], filtering false
data reports [151], or intrusion detection [115], but to the best of our knowl-
edge have not been studied in the context of query authentication in sensor
networks.
In the following, we present the detailed description of the most relevant
for this chapter related work.
6.2.1 ID-Based Random Key Predistribution
Random key predistribution for sensor networks originates from [55]. The
idea is that each sensor node is preloaded with randomly chosen k keys,
called key ring, from the key pool of size l. The values of l and k can be
chosen such that any two nodes have at least one common key with a given
probability.
However, here we do not care about the probability that two neighboring
nodes share a key, because in our scheme, key predistribution is used not
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for secure and authenticated communication between the neighboring sensor
nodes, but for authenticated querying.
ID-based random key predistribution was introduced in [158]. The keys
in the key pool are numbered from 1 to l. Each sensor node s with a unique
identifier ids is first assigned k distinct integers between 1 and l by applying
a pseudorandom number generator PRG() with the seed ids. Then the node
s is preloaded with the keys whose identifiers are these k numbers from the
sequence of pseudorandom numbers PRG(ids).
This method of choosing key rings enables to characterize sets of key
identifiers very efficiently, as only the corresponding short seed needs to be
known. This helps to save energy in a sensor network if the set of key
identifiers needs to be transmitted over the air, as radio communication is
very expensive in terms of energy. In this case, only the seed x is transmitted.
Then, any node can determine if it knows some keys from a set of key
identifiersKIDx characterized by the seed x. It computes PRG(x) = KIDx
and compares its own key identifiers to the key identifiers from KIDx.
6.2.2 1-bit MACs
In our protocol, we use message authentication codes (MACs) with a single
bit output. The idea of using 1-bit MACs for broadcast authentication
originates from [35]. We view a 1-bit MAC under a given key as a random
function, i.e., we require the following:
 A single 1-bit MAC (under an unknown random key) cannot be feasi-
bly guessed with any probability significantly exceeding 12 .
 Similarly, an m-bit string of m 1-bit MACs under m independent ran-
dom keys cannot be guessed with probability significantly more than
1
2m .
1-bit MACs can be constructed from the usual MACs by taking their
first bit of output.
6.3 System and Adversary Model
The generic system and adversary models were specified in Section 3.2. As
presented there, we consider a large sensor network with a large number of
users. The users can send queries to the network.
We consider an adversary with the goal of sending arbitrary queries to
the network. The adversary can capture some sensor nodes, the number of
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captured nodes is not limited but should be significantly smaller than the
number of nodes in the network. We do not make any assumptions concern-
ing the distribution of the captured nodes over the network. As stated in
Section 3.2, this results in the distributed reprogramming adversary.
However, the schemes developed in this chapter can withstand a more
powerful adversary than the one presented in Section 3.2. Whereas previ-
ously we considered the global eavesdropping adversary, in the sequel we
consider a global adversary that can delete and replay messages, and also
inject his own messages into the network. These capabilities result in the
following adversary type:
{A1(global, disturbing),A2(distributed, reprogramming)}
6.4 Basic Authenticated Query Flooding
6.4.1 Protocol bAQF
We assume that ID-based random key predistribution as described in Sec-
tion 6.2.1 is used in the network, and we want to reuse the predistributed
keys for authenticated querying.
We now describe our basic protocol for authenticated query flooding,
called bAQF. Pseudo-code descriptions of the algorithms for the base station
and the sensor nodes are given in Algorithms 6.4.1 and 6.4.2.
Base station. The base station first computes the query q and a hash
x = h(q) of the query using a cryptographic hash function h() [106]. Then
it generatesm key identifiers for the underlying ID-based key predistribution
scheme: KIDx = PRG(x) = (kid1, . . . , kidm). We denote the correspond-
ing key sequence by Kx = (keykid1 , ..., keykidm).
Then the base station computes m 1-bit MACs on h(q) using the keys
from Kx. We call these m 1-bit MACs authenticator for q, denoted as
macs(q).
Finally, the base station floods the query q into the sensor network,
accompanied by the authenticator for the query.
Sensor nodes. Upon receiving the query q with the authenticatormacs(q),
each node s computes x = h(q) and the sequence of key identifiers KIDx =
PRG(x). It compares the key identifiers from KIDx to its own key identi-
fiers in order to find out if it knows some keys from Kx.
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If s knows some keys, it verifies the corresponding 1-bit MACs from
macs(q). If any one of them does not verify correctly, the sensor drops the
query. If all verifiable MACs are correct or if the node is not able to verify
any MACs (i.e., it does not know any keys from Kx), the node forwards the
query to its neighbors according to the underlying flooding mechanism or
transport protocol.
Algorithm 6.4.1: bAQF-generate (Query q, KeyPool (key1, . . . , keyl))
x = h(q) /* compute the hash value */
KIDx = (kid1, . . . , kidm) = PRG(x) ∈ {1, . . . , l}m
macs(q) = (mac1, . . . ,macm) =
(1-bit-MAC(keykid1 , x), . . . , 1-bit-MAC(keykidm , x))
return macs(q)
Algorithm 6.4.2: bAQF-verify (q, macs(q), KeyRing (keyr1 , . . . , keyrk))
x = h(q) /* compute the hash value */
PRG-init(x)
for i = 1 to m do
kidi =PRG-next()
if kidi ∈ {r1, . . . , rk} then
if 1-bit-MAC(keykidi , x) 6= maci then
return false /* reject the query */
end if
end if
end for
return true /* forward the query */
6.4.2 Analysis
The query of a legitimate user will be flooded into the sensor network without
any obstacles. However, a query forged by an adversary will only be able to
reach a limited part of the network, as some sensor nodes will discard the
query. In the following, we analytically determine how many 1-bit MACs
should be appended to a query in order to limit the propagation of a fake
query to a small constant part of the network.
The variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 6.1.
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meaning of the variable variable typical values
number of nodes in the sensor network n 1000− 10000
number of keys in the key pool l 10000 - 100000
number of keys in the key ring of a node k 50 - 250
node density (average number of neighbors of a
node)
d 5 - 50
number of captured senor nodes n˜ 0− 50
number of captured keys b˜ Formula 6.1
number of keys in the authenticator which the
adversary knows
Eb˜ Formula 6.2
number of correct bits in the fake authenticator B Formula 6.3
probability that the message will be forwarded pf Formula 6.5
size of the authenticator m 100 - 500 bits
Table 6.1: Variables used in the analysis of bAQF
6.4.2.1 Probability of Accepting a Fake Query by an Arbitrary
Node
Using a common model for cryptographic hash functions [12], it is infeasible
to first choose some x and then search for an appropriate value q with
h(q) = x, or to fix any properties for the desired x and then search for a
query q with satisfying h(q). For different queries q, the adversary always
receives independent random values x = h(q).
Therefore, we assume that the adversary uses the following strategy:
It computes the seed x = h(q) for its query q, computes the appropriate
sequence of key identifiers KIDx using PRG(x), and hopes that it knows
enough keys with identifiers from KIDx in order to be able to construct a
fake query.
In the following, we compute the probability of a fake query generated as
above to propagate successfully through the sensor network assuming that
the adversary captured n˜ sensor nodes and guessed the bits of authenticator
which it could not compute.
If n˜ sensor nodes are compromised, then the adversary knows on average
b˜ keys:
b˜ = l(1− (1− k
l
)n˜) (6.1)
Formula 6.1 assumes that the keys are distributed according to the uni-
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form probability distribution. Given that the adversary knows b˜ keys out of
l, we can compute the average number of bits in an authenticator of length
m that will be correct due to the adversary’s partial knowledge of the key
space l:
Eb˜ = m
b˜
l
(6.2)
Since the attacker knows nothing about the other keys in the authenti-
cator, it has to guess the other bits. There it will have the probability of
50% to guess the correct value. This lets us compute the total number of
correct bits in the faked authenticator:
B = Eb˜ +
m− Eb˜
2
=
m(b˜+ l)
2l
=
m(2− (1− kl )n˜)
2
(6.3)
We can finally compute the probability pf that a sensor accepts the
query with the fake authenticator:
pf =
(
l − k
l
+
k
l
B
m
)m
(6.4)
The expression in the parentheses gives the probability that one bit of
the authenticator passed the test by a particular sensor node. The first sum-
mand expresses the probability that the sensor node does not share any keys
with the claimed set of key identifiers PRG(x). The second summand shows
the probability that the adversary either could compute the appropriate bit
or guessed it.
Substituting B in Formula 6.4 using Formula 6.3 finally yields:
pf =
(
1− 1
2
k
l
(
1− k
l
)n˜)m
(6.5)
6.4.2.2 Limiting the Propagation of Fake Queries
The last section calculated the probability that each single node forwards a
fake query. It is yet open, however, how the network as a total behaves,
namely, whether the query reaches a significant number of nodes, or is
stopped from doing so.
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node decided to forward the query
node decided not to forward the querystopped links
working links
Figure 6.1: Query propagation in a branching-process-like network (to the
left), and in a wireless sensor network.
To assess the network-wide behavior of our scheme, the propagation of
fake queries can be roughly approximated by the development of a variant
of a branching process [56]. In this process, entities which can produce
entities of the same kind are considered. A single entity starts the process.
Each entity creates d descendants with probability p, and does not create
any descendants with probability 1 − p. Thus, the population of entities
may extinct after some generations if too little entities are produced. It is
well known that if dp < 1, the extinction happens with probability 1. A
branching-process-like network is a d-regular tree, see Figure 6.1. The root
starts the query propagation. After receiving the query, each node forwards
the query with probability p, and remains silent with probability 1− p.
We can consider the dissemination of a fake query as a branching process
with p = pf . However, this is only a rough estimation, because of the higher
connectivity of sensor networks. For example, in Figure 6.1, only four nodes
of the last depicted generation receive the query, and only two nodes forward
the query. However, in the example sensor network, 7 nodes receive the
query, and four of them forward the query. Nevertheless, we will see in the
following that this estimation gives sufficiently good results which are also
confirmed by simulation.
If we see the fake query dissemination as a branching process, we have
the following criterion for the propagation of the fake query to be stopped:
pfd < 1 (6.6)
Another justification for Formula 6.6 is as follows. If a node has d neigh-
bors, each of them forwarding the fake query with the probability pf , then
the average number of nodes which forward the query is pfd. In this case,
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the query propagation should be limited if less than one neighbor on average
forward the fake query.
From Formulas 6.5 and 6.6 it follows:
1
d > pf =
(
1− 1
2
k
l
(
1− k
l
)n˜)m
(6.7)
⇔ m > − log d
log
(
1− 12 kl
(
1− kl
)n˜) (6.8)
6.4.3 Choosing Parameters
In Formula 6.8, we have variable parameters d, l, k, n˜ for the length of the
authenticator m. The administrators of the network control parameters
d, l, k and m, while the adversary controls n˜.
The next task is to find suitable ranges for d, l, k and m, such that the
adversary is unable to send fake queries for reasonable ranges of n˜. We did
so analytically, as well as by simulation (see Section 6.4.4).
Firstly, we comment on the choice of the node density parameter. If the
node density is too high, then the capacity of wireless networks decreases.
On the other hand, if the network density is too low, the network may
become disconnected. Node density required to ensure connectivity can be
estimated as Θ(log n) [149], but the exact number of neighbors remains an
open problem. For networks of moderate size, 6 to 8 neighbors may be
considered [113].
The size of the key ring k is constrained by the amount of memory
available on sensor nodes. In a typical sensor node the RAM size is about
10 kB. Then, if the key size is 80 bits,the nodes would be able to hold up to
200 keys. After choosing k, we can choose l such that kl is sufficiently small.
As the key pool is stored at the base station, we do not have serious limits
on the size of l.
Figure 6.2 depicts the necessary authenticator sizes for node density 7,
depending on the ratio kl , and the number of compromised nodes n˜ according
to Formula 6.8. It can be clearly seen that there is an optimal ratio kl for any
particular number of compromised nodes. Below we analytically determine
this ratio.
Firstly, we find first derivation of the Expression 6.9, which evolves from
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Figure 6.2: Necessary authenticator size for node density d = 7, depending
on the ratio of the key ring size k to the size of the key pool l, and the
number of compromised nodes n˜.
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Formula 6.8 with the substitution kl = λ:
m =
− log d
log
(
1− 12λ (1− λ)n˜
) ⇒ (6.9)
dm
dλ
=
log d
2
−(1− λ)n˜ + λn˜ (1−λ)n˜(1−λ)
log
(
1− λ2 (1− λ)n˜
)2 (
1− λ2 (1− λ)n˜
) (6.10)
Then we can find the optimal λ such that m is minimized:
dm
dλ
= 0 ⇒ λmin = 11 + n˜ (6.11)
Then we can find the minimum authenticator size m depending on the
number of captured nodes n˜:
mmin =
− log d
log
(
1− 12 11+n˜( n˜n˜+1)n˜
) (6.12)
Figure 6.3 depicts mmin for node density = 7. The function is almost
linear, which is also confirmed by simulations in Section 6.4.4.
6.4.4 Simulation Results
We simulated bAQF using Shawn [89], a discrete event simulator for large
wireless sensor networks. We used a key pool of l = 10, 000 keys and varied
node density d ∈ {7, 15} and key ring size k ∈ {75, 150}. In each simulation
run, 1000 nodes were randomly and uniformly placed such that the given
node density d was satisfied. The source of the query (base station or the
adversary) was also placed randomly in the sensor field. The query was sent,
accompanied by the authenticator of size m. We looked into the number of
nodes reached by an illegitimate query for m = 50, 100, 150, . . . , 500 assum-
ing that the adversary captured n˜ = 0, 1, 2, 4, 16, 32, 64, 128 nodes. For each
combination of parameters, 50 protocol runs on different network topologies
were performed. We only present the most significant results here.
To make the comparison to the analytical results easier, we also show the
the results of the analytical evaluation using Formula 6.8 for the parameters
above in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.3: Minimum authenticator size mmin for node density 7 depending
on the number of compromised nodes.
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Figure 6.5: Number of nodes reached by the fake query depending on au-
thenticator size, with node density 15 and key ring size 75.
At node density 15 and key ring size 75 all the networks were fully
connected, that is, legitimate queries always reached all of nodes. However,
also illegitimate queries reached a significant part of the network even if no
nodes were captured, until the authenticator size reached the unacceptable
500 bits. This confirms our analytical results showing that in this case,
authenticator size of around 700 bits are needed, see Figure 6.4.
Formula 6.8 indicates that the size of the authenticator decreases with
the decreasing node density and increasing key ring size. In Figure 6.6,
results for node density 7 and key ring size 150 are presented. With node
density 7, the network may already become disconnected. However, the
number of sensors which were disconnected from the network in this case
was negligible. According to simulations, authenticator size m = 250 bits is
adequate in case the adversary captured around 30 nodes. Analytical results
suggest the authenticator of around 400 bits here.
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According to Formula 6.11 , in case the network density d = 7 and the
number of compromised nodes n˜ = 64, the optimal ratio kl =
1
65 = 0.015
can be computed. The minimum authenticator size for this case is around
700 bits according to Figure 6.3. Our simulation for this scenario, with
k
l =
150
10000 = 0.015 depicted in Figure 6.6, suggest the authenticator size
around 500 bits.
In general, we can see that our analysis gives an estimate of the authen-
ticator size very much “on the safe side”, and therefore, can be used for
determining parameters of our scheme with an adjustment.
6.4.5 Improving Efficiency
The protocol bAQF works efficiently for sparse sensor networks. That is, the
sparser the network the less the size of the authenticator. The reason that
in denser networks larger authenticator size is required lies in the fact that
if each sensor node has a lot of neighbors, each forwarding event increases
the probability of a query to get trough the network. And as the adversary
always can guess at least half of the bits in the authenticator, even queries
with completely guessed authenticator propagate successfully.
To thwart this disadvantage, more sophisticated flooding mechanisms,
such as studied in [146, 152] should be used. These mechanisms reduce the
communication cost of flooding through restricted dissemination of mes-
sages. The nodes do not forward all messages to all their neighbors. Instead,
the nodes may forward messages only to a restricted set neighbors. Another
technique is that only a restricted set of nodes may forward the messages,
and the other nodes remain silent in the flooding process.
Reducing the number of all possible paths which a faked query may
take results in the reduced authenticator size. For example, if the network
is organized as a spanning tree, then stopping the fake query at one node
means that all nodes in the subtree rooted at this node do not receive the
fake query.
6.4.6 Attacks and Countermeasures
6.4.6.1 Thwarting the Global Disturbing Adversary
As presented in Section 6.3, our adversary model is a combination of global
disturbing and distributed reprogramming adversary. We consider the global
disturbing adversary first.
As the global disturbing adversary can send messages to all network
nodes simultaneously, the obvious attack is global jamming. Defenses against
6.4 Basic Authenticated Query Flooding 113
this attack were presented, e.g., by Wood et al. [147] and are not considered
here. Another DoS attack is sending meaningless messages to all nodes,
such that they have to spend energy in verifying them. However, as the
principal goal of the adversary considered here is to send arbitrary queries
to the network, we also do not consider sophisticated defenses against this
attack here. A simple approach is for the nodes to shut down for some time
after the rate of received invalid queries exceeds a predefined threshold.
On the other hand, principal goal of the adversary, according to Sec-
tion 6.3, is to send arbitrary queries to the WSN, i.e., to gain the same
access to the data as the legitimate user. We now consider an adversary
that sends the same fake query to all nodes in the network. If the network
size is n, then pfn nodes on average will accept the fake query as a legiti-
mate one. As the probability pf can be as large as 0.3 (or even 0.5 in some
cases), the fraction of nodes that accept the fake query can be fairly large.
In order to find a countermeasure to this attack, we note that the query
sent by a global adversary should appear to come from a legitimate node (a
node should not accept any messages coming out of the thin air). Thus, if
all nodes know their neighbors and have means to verify that the message
came from a particular neighbor, the global disturbing adversary is unable
to send the same message to all nodes simultaneously.
We assume that the nodes know their neighbors, and that each node
can authenticate its local broadcast using, e.g., one-way key chains as in
LEAP [156]. Local broadcast authentication actually precludes the global
disturbing adversary from sending any legitimate messages at all, as each
node only accepts authenticated messages from its immediate neighbors. To
send a legitimate message, the adversary has to know the authentication in-
formation of the node. Thus, in our adversary model, only the distributed
reprogramming part of the adversary can send meaningful messages to le-
gitimate nodes.
In the following, we always assume that appropriate measures were taken
for defending the global disturbing adversary, and consider the distributed
reprogramming adversary in the sequel.
6.4.6.2 Denial-of-Service attacks
The adversary may try to drain the energy of sensor nodes by sending il-
legitimate queries which the sensor nodes have to verify. However, as our
protocol guarantees that fake queries propagate only to a small constant
part of the network, this attack will only affect a small network region.
We note that any kind of DoS attack requires the adversary to propagate
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a large amount of queries into the sensor network. Below, we discuss the
attacks where the goal of the adversary is to propagate illegitimate queries
in order to receive answers to them. The countermeasures to these attacks
will also protect the network against DoS attacks.
6.4.6.3 Simple replay attack
By just listening to valid conversations, the adversary can easily learn many
pairs (q,macs(q)) of query and valid authenticator. Our protocol does not
provide any defense against the adversary sending such pairs again – at any
point in time, and as often as useful for the adversary.
Countermeasures The application can defend against such attacks, e.g.,
by using timestamps and storing the queries from the current time-frame.
A query (q, x) is then not forwarded if q has been sent in the current time
frame, or if the time-stamp inside q does not fit. Note that knowing the
authenticator macs(q) for a query q does not help the adversary in guessing
the authenticator macs(q′) for q′ 6= q, even if q′ is identical to q except for
the timestamp. The disadvantage of this countermeasure is that it relies
on time synchronization, whereas the goal of this work was to devise an
authentication protocol which does not use synchronized clocks.
However, with our scheme we can use other approaches which guarantee
message freshness, e.g., counters [67]. In this case, the base station dissem-
inates the queries accompanied by a counter instead of the timestamp, and
the sensor nodes discard queries with “old” counters.
The latter countermeasure opens a possibility for a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack. The adversary may send a faked query with the future counter
c. Then the sensor nodes which accept the query as a legitimate, or cannot
verify the query, would not accept the legitimate query accompanied by the
counter c. However, this DoS attack is localized. As the query is faked,
only a small part of the nodes will accept it. Then, also only a small part
of the nodes would be unable to answer the legitimate query with the same
counter.
From now on, we assume that the adversary sends a query q without
knowing the correct authenticator macs(q) in advance.
6.4.6.4 Key identifier disclosure attack
Let e(i) = (0i−110m−i−1) ∈ {0, 1}m be the m-bit vector with exactly one
bit set to 1, namely at position i. Let an authentic message (q,macs(q))
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be given. The defense from simple replays would allow a sensor node s to
reject any message (q, x).
Let us assume, however, that s did not hear the query (q,macs(q)),
because the adversary shielded it from the network. Then the adversary
can easily find out which single-bit MACs are verified by s (or, equivalently,
the identifiers of the keys which s holds):
 Send (q,macs(q)⊕ e(i)) to s.
 If s accepts this as authentic, i.e., forwards q, then s does not check
the i-th MAC.
 Else, s rejects (q,macs(q)⊕ e(i)) – and thus, holds the i-th key.
Countermeasures The above attack assumes that the adversary sends
out a lot of queries – most of them being invalid. To defend, a node simply
counts the number of invalid requests it receives. If the counter exceeds a
certain threshold, the node considers itself under attack and switches off.
An advanced variant of this countermeasure would allow to forward queries
according to some probability distribution that depends on the number of
invalid requests, e.g., some exponentially decreasing probability.
6.4.6.5 Modifying replay attacks
If the adversary is able to send a query q with different authenticators
macs(q), it might gain a broader access to the network in case the ad-
versary can observe parts of the network. The attack works as follows: if
the adversary has no knowledge about a single bit in macs(q), it sends one
message with the bit set, and one with the bit cleared. It can then guess
from the number of nodes accepting the message, whether the bit should
be set or not. This can be repeated for all bits that are unknown to the
adversary, until the message either reaches a sufficient number of sensors, or
the adversary knows how to set all bits correctly.
Countermeasures As in the previous key identifier disclosure attack, the
adversary sends out a high number of invalid queries. Then switching off
sensor nodes that receive invalid queries too often effectively isolates the
compromised node, such that it is unable to send future requests.
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6.4.7 Comparison to Related Work
We now consider which goals of the broadcast authentication from Sec-
tion 4.6.1 on page 56 are satisfied by bAQF.
We first note that bAQF is moderately communication efficient. For ex-
ample, with the authenticator size of 250 bits (32 bytes), we are able to
restrict the propagation of the fake query to approximately 10 nodes in suf-
ficiently sparse networks. Thus, the bAQF authenticator is smaller than an
ECC digital signature that is 40 bytes long, but it is much less efficient than
µTESLA that requires 4 bytes per message and 20 bytes per time interval.
However, bAQF does not need time synchronization. Moreover, it provides
immediate authentication of an arbitrary number of messages (without the
need in re-initialization), and the impact of DoS attacks is contained to a
small part of the network.
bAQF is also quite computation efficient, as it uses only a moderate
amount of symmetric cryptography operations. In order to estimate the
performance of the query verification algorithm bAQF-verify of our scheme
bAQF, we assume the key pool size l = 10, 000, and the key ring size k = 150.
Therefore, the size of a key identifier is 14 bits, we take 16 bits for con-
venience of computation. As our analysis and simulations suggest authen-
ticator size m of 200-300 bits, we assume m = 256 for convenience. The
verification of the query q consists of computing its hash value h(q), gen-
erating 256 key identifiers using PRG(h(q)), and finally computing some
MACs on h(q). On average, a sensor node would know m·kl keys from the
authenticator. Thus, the sensor node needs to generate 256 · 16 = 4096
pseudorandom bits, and to compute d256·15010,000 e = 4 MACs on average. We
note that the pseudo-random number generator does not need to be cryp-
tographically secure, and can therefore be implemented very efficiently.
6.4.8 Summary
We presented a probabilistic protocol bAQF for authenticated query flooding
in sensor networks. The protocol guarantees that the faked queries can only
reach a small part of the network that does not depend on the number of
nodes in the network, but on the network density. For example, using the
authenticator of size around 250 bits, we are able to restrict the propagation
of the fake query to approximately 10 nodes in sufficiently sparse networks.
However, our protocol also may be used in denser sensor networks if they
employ an advanced query dissemination strategy that reduces the number
of nodes forwarding the query.
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In the next section, we present a more efficient protocol for authenticated
querying that satisfies the same properties.
6.5 Simple Authenticated Query Flooding
The protocol bAQF presented in the previous section was developed under
the assumption that the considered sensor network employs an ID-based
random key predistribution scheme for organizing secure communication
between sensor nodes. We aimed at reusing the key rings of the nodes for
authenticated querying.
However, Formula 6.5 shows that the probability for node to recognize a
fake query depends on the ratio kl , where k is the number keys per node, and
l is the overall number of keys in the key pool. Thus, if we do not consider a
network which employs random key predistribution, more efficiency can be
gained by minimizing the value of k. Then the value of l would also decrease.
Actually, it can be as small as m, the number of bits in the authenticator.
Based on this idea, we developed the protocol sAQF (simple Authenticated
Query Flooding) which is described and analyzed in the following.
6.5.1 Protocol sAQF
We now describe a more efficient than bAQF protocol for authenticated query
flooding, called sAQF. Here, the key pool comprisesm keys, and all these keys
are used to generate the authenticator. Thus, the authenticator contains m
1-bit MACs, and each sensor node can verify k of these MACs using its key
ring. The m keys are numbered, such that each node knows at which place
at the authenticator it should verify the k 1-bit MACs which are known to
it.
Pseudo-code descriptions of the algorithms for the base station and the
sensor nodes are given in Algorithms 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.
Base station. The base station knows m symmetric keys key1, . . . keym.
This collection of keys is called key pool.
The base station first computes the query q and a hash x = h(q) of the
query using a hash function h(). Then it generates m 1-bit MACs on h(q).
We call these m 1-bit MACs authenticator for q, denoted as macs(q).
Finally, the base station floods the query q into the sensor network,
accompanied by the authenticator for the query.
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Sensor nodes. Each sensor knows k keys from the key pool which are
selected randomly and independently for each sensor according to the uni-
form probability distribution. The nodes know the IDs of their keys. Node’s
collection of keys is called key ring.
Upon receiving a new query q with the authenticatormacs(q), each node
s verifies the k 1-bit MACs from macs(q) which should be computed using
its k keys.
If all verified MACs are correct, the node forwards the query to its neigh-
bors according to the underlying flooding mechanism or transport protocol.
Otherwise, the query is dropped.
Algorithm 6.5.1: sAQF-generate (Query q, KeyPool (key1, . . . , keym))
x = h(q) /* compute the hash value */
macs(q) = (mac1, . . . ,macm) =
(1-bit-MAC(key1, x), . . . , 1-bit-MAC(keym, x))
return macs(q)
Algorithm 6.5.2: sAQF-verify (q, macs(q), KeyRing (keyr1 , . . . , keyrk))
x = h(q) /* compute the hash value */
for i = 1 to k do
if 1-bit-MAC(keyri , x) 6= macri then
return false /* reject the query */
end if
end for
return true /* forward the query */
6.5.2 Analysis
6.5.2.1 Probability of Accepting a Fake Query by an Arbitrary
Node
Assume that the adversary captured n˜ nodes and, therefore, knows their
key rings. The adversary computes its query and tries to compute the
corresponding authenticator.
Consider the ith authenticator bit. If the adversary knows keyi, it can
compute the corresponding 1-bit MAC. If the adversary does not know keyi,
its best strategy is to guess the corresponding 1-bit MAC with probability
1
2 .
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Assume that node s which is not captured by the adversary receives the
fake query and starts verification of some authenticator bit bi. We firstly
compute the probability pbit known that the adversary was able to compute
bi due to its partial knowledge of the key pool. The probability that one of
the captured nodes does not have the corresponding key keyi in its key ring
is
1− k
m
(6.13)
As the nodes are captured independently, the probability that none of
the captured nodes knows keyi is
(
1− k
m
)n˜
(6.14)
Thus, the probability that at least one captured node knows keyi is
pbit known = 1−
(
1− k
m
)n˜
(6.15)
On the other hand, the adversary does not know bi with probability
1 − pbit known. In this case, the adversary has to guess the bit. Thus, it
guesses bi with probability
pguessed =
1
2
(
1− k
m
)n˜
(6.16)
Putting together Equations 6.15 and 6.16, the adversary computes bi
correctly with probability
1− 1
2
(
1− k
m
)n˜
(6.17)
Therefore, the adversary correctly computes all k bits that a particular
node can verify with probability
pf =
(
1− 1
2
(
1− k
m
)n˜)k
(6.18)
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6.5.2.2 Limiting the Propagation of Fake Queries
Using the same reasoning as in the analysis of bAQF in Section 6.4.2.2, we
suggest the following criterion for limiting the propagation of the fake query:
pfd < 1 (6.19)
Here d is the average number of node’s neighbors. Of course, this crite-
rion works especially well in networks with uniformly distributed nodes.
6.5.3 Choosing Parameters
Analogous to Section 6.4.3, it is also possible to find the optimal k such that
m is minimized for every pair of parameters d and n˜. As the method and the
results of this analysis are very similar to the results of the analysis of bAQF,
we do not present it here. Instead, we present some clarifying examples.
6.5.3.1 Query Propagation by Flooding
We consider the authenticator size m = 200 bits, as the analysis and sim-
ulations in Section 6.4 showed that a smaller authenticator size does not
work well for realistic node densities if the query dissemination is organized
using flooding. We also consider m = 400 bits as an upper bound on the
authenticator size. This is due to the fact that a digital signature using
elliptic curves (e.g., the ECDSA standard [46]) has size of about 320 bits.
The upper bound on the number of compromised nodes was shown to
be at around n˜ = 50. On the other hand, for n˜ = 20 the simulation of bAQF
showed quite a good results.
Having fixed the parameters m and n˜, we can now find the optimal
k such that pf is minimized. In Figure 6.7 pf is computed according to
Formula 6.18 for all four combination of the parameters m and n˜ above is
depicted.
We can see that for each pair (m, n˜) there is an optimal value of the key
ring size k which minimizes the probability of forwarding the fake query. For
example, form = 200 and 20 compromised nodes, the optimal size of the key
ring is k = 8, and the corresponding probability pf ≈ 0.14. Then, according
to our criterion, the fake query should be stopped effectively for the networks
where the nodes have 7 or less neighbors on average. In Section 6.5.4 we
verify this result further using simulations.
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Figure 6.7: Probability of forwarding the fake query for the authenticator
size m ∈ {200, 400} and the number of compromised nodes n˜ ∈ {20, 50}.
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6.5.3.2 Query Propagation along a Spanning Tree
If the network is organized as a spanning tree with a moderate degree, we
can afford even quite small authenticator sizes such as m = 100.
In a spanning tree, the fake query can propagate only along subtrees
rooted at the compromised nodes. Moreover, for each honest node s, there
is a single path along that a fake query may arrive.
Consider the propagation of the fake query along a single path. Each
non-compromised node along the path drops the fake query with probability
1 − pf . Thus, we can consider the fake query forwarding as a Bernoulli
process. Then the expected number of forwarding events till the first drop
is 11−pf .
For m = 100 and n˜ = 30 the optimal number of keys pro node can
be computed as k = 3, and the minimal probability of forwarding the fake
query is pf ≈ 0.51. Then the expected number of forwarding events for the
fake query is 2.04. This means that a query that started at some node in the
spanning tree would reach on average the third level of the subtree rooted
at this node.
It can be shown that in a uniformly distributed network, the average
degree of the spanning tree goes to 1 with the increasing network diameter.
Thus, for such a network, authenticator size m = 100 could suffice.
We note, however, that if the security of an authentication scheme relies
on topology control in the network, then secure topology control schemes
should be developed. Secure spanning tree construction, as well as other
secure schemes for topology control, would be an interesting and challenging
future work.
6.5.4 Simulation Results
We simulated sAQF on the network of 1000 nodes with node density d = 7
for the authenticator sizesm ∈ {200, 400} and key ring sizes k ∈ {4, 6, 8, 10}.
We varied the number of compromised nodes n˜ ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. The
goal was to validate the analysis in Section 6.5.2.
Figure 6.8 shows the number of nodes that accepted the fake query for
the authenticator size 200 bits. Key ring size k = 8 is analytically optimal
for n˜ = 20 compromised nodes, as shown in Figure 6.7. On the other hand,
k = 4 is optimal for n˜ = 50.
We can see that sAQF with k = 8 indeed performs very well for n˜ = 20.
Less than 2 nodes on average accept the fake query. Also for n˜ = 30 the
scheme behaves well, as only approximately 8 nodes accept the fake query.
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In the latter case, pf ≈ 0.28 according to Formula 6.18. This means that the
node density for that the scheme works well should be less than 10.28 ≈ 3.6.
We can see that the criterion in Formula 6.19 slightly underestimates the
security of sAQF.
On the other hand, sAQF with k = 4 also behaves well for n˜ ≤ 30, even
if its performance is slightly worse than for k = 8. However, for n˜ = 40 the
situation changes rapidly. Here, the number of nodes that accepted the fake
query for k = 4 is more than tree times less than for k = 8 (30 versus 100).
The latter observation shows that the security of the proposed scheme
degrades gracefully with the increasing number of compromised nodes un-
til a threshold is reached where the scheme becomes completely insecure.
Therefore, a realistic upper bound on the number of compromised nodes to
be tolerated should be fixed beforehand, and the other parameters of the
scheme should be computed accordingly.
6.5.5 Summary
We presented sAQF, a probabilistic protocol for authenticated querying which
degrades gracefully with the growing number of captured nodes ans is more
efficient than bAQF from Section 6.4.
Just as bAQF, the protocol sAQF restricts the propagation of the fake
query to a small constant part of the network that is dependent on the net-
work topology and on the underlying topology control mechanism. For ex-
ample, using the authenticator of size around 200 bits, we are able to restrict
the propagation of the fake query to less than 10 nodes given 20 compro-
mised sensor nodes in the network with average node density 7. Moreover,
in the networks organized in spanning trees with moderate tree degree the
authenticator size can be reduced to around 100 bits.
The security properties of sAQF are the same as of bAQF (see Section 6.4.6).
Furthermore, sAQF also exhibits several properties that are desirable for
broadcast authentication. It does not need time synchronization, provides
immediate authentication of an arbitrary number of messages (without the
need in re-initialization), and the impact of DoS attacks is contained to a
small part of the network.
6.6 Conclusions
In this work we presented probabilistic protocols bAQF and sAQF for authen-
ticated query flooding in sensor networks. The protocols guarantee that the
faked queries can only reach a small part of the network that does not depend
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on the number of nodes in the network, but on the network density. Our
protocols outperform many other broadcast authentication solutions while
having no special requirements such as time synchronization, reliable links,
or special topological structures. Moreover, are resilient to DoS attacks,
they can authenticate arbitrary number of messages and do not require re-
initialization. To our knowledge, bAQF and sAQF are the first broadcast
authentication protocols that combine all above features. The security of
the protocols degrades gracefully with the growing number of compromised
nodes.
The price that one have to pay for all these good properties is the prob-
abilistic nature of authentication. That is, each individual sensor node can
accept a fake query with some small probability.
The utilization of bAQF and sAQF for direct access control at the base
station is quite straightforward. The remote access control via base station
can be organized using a probabilistic method for report authentication such
as presented in Ye et al. [151]. We leave the organization of remote base
station access control and of decentralized access control based on bAQF and
sAQF to future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future
Work
This thesis investigates how to protect the sensor network data from unau-
thorized access and makes two main contributions to this challenging field.
Firstly, we develop the first flexible and extendable framework for defin-
ing adversaries in sensor networks. Our framework is based on systematic
investigation of vulnerabilities in sensor networks, specifically focusing on
physical attacks on sensor node hardware. These are all attacks that re-
quire direct physical access to the sensor nodes. Most severe attacks of this
kind are also known as node capture, or node compromise.
After the adversary models took a clearly defined shape, we proceed to
the investigation of access control mechanisms in sensor networks in presence
of node capture attacks. We decompose the control access procedure into
two logically separated phases and consider different solutions to each phase.
We firstly develop deterministic solutions that offer complete security in case
not more than a threshold number t of nodes is compromised, and completely
break down otherwise. The developed algorithms offer nice properties for
small values of t, but become prohibitively inefficient already for around 10
compromised nodes.
Trying to increase the efficiency of the results, we turn to probabilistic
security. We develop access control protocols that retain all desirable prop-
erties of the deterministic solutions apart from allowing the sensor nodes
to fail in recognizing an illegitimate claim for data with a small probabil-
ity. The security of the developed probabilistic solutions degrades gracefully
with the increasing number of compromised nodes.
We conclude that probabilistic security is more appropriate for resource-
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constrained sensor networks than the traditional deterministic security in
the distributed systems area. This thesis represents one of the first steps
towards probabilistic, gracefully degrading security solutions. More research
is needed to fully understand the impact of probabilistic security on the
ubiquitous systems such as sensor networks.
Chapter 2: Security Threats and Adversary Models. Experiences
with the real-world deployment of sensor network are very limited, and there-
fore, the development of security solutions for sensor networks is impeded by
the absence of realistic adversary models. However, if the impact of the at-
tacks in the system is not defined beforehand, developing security solutions
becomes not only difficult, but also meaningless. Chapter 2 presents the
first approach to formal definition of adversaries in WSNs. This approach
is flexible and extendable, and is based upon the first (to our knowledge)
systematical investigation of real-world attacks on sensor node hardware.
In the last few months, many other researchers gained interest in the
investigation of sensor network vulnerabilities. Most notably, code injection
attacks were very recently presented by Francillon and Castelluccia [59].
Attacking sensor networks is a rapidly growing research area. New attacks
may facilitate extensions to the adversary model presented in this thesis.
On the other hand, we believe that further formalization and refinement of
adversary models for sensor networks will help to engineer less vulnerable
sensor networks in the future.
Chapter 3: Access Control Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks.
In Chapter 3 we firstly precisely describe the system and adversary models
for the algorithms in this thesis. Using the framework from the previous
chapter, we consider the adversary that can eavesdrop on messages in the
entire network, and can additionally gain full control over a limited num-
ber of sensor nodes. We then identify and precisely define two phases of
access control to sensor network data. During the user access control the
user proves its legitimacy to the base station or to the surrounding sensor
nodes. This phase belongs to the realm of outside security where the sen-
sor network is considered as a single entity communicating with the user.
In the phase of authenticated querying user’s query is forwarded into the
network accompanied by an authenticator. The authenticator enables the
nodes that did not participate in the user access control phase to verify the
legitimacy of the query and belongs to the area of inside security, i.e., secure
communication between the individual sensor nodes.
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We also consider design space for access control solutions in sensor net-
works, and identify the following four access control methods: direct versus
remote base station access control, and direct versus remote decentralized
access control. In the first two solutions, the base station acts as a trusted
entity. In the last two cases, access control is organized using cooperation
between sensor nodes.
The core of solutions to authenticated querying constitute broadcast au-
thentication protocols where one sender is required to authenticate its mes-
sages to the multiple receivers in presence of an attacker that can gain full
control over some receivers.
Chapter 4: Background And Related Work on WSN Security. In
Chapter 4 we present background information on sensor network architec-
ture and security. We consider query processing and dissemination in sensor
networks, access control in general, and also specific sensor network security
topics: key establishment, broadcast authentication and secure code update,
report authentication and authenticated aggregation.
We identify the desirable properties for broadcast authentication that
are most suitable for authenticated querying. These properties are (see also
Section 4.6.1): low computation overhead, low communication overhead, in-
dependence on time synchronization and on network topology, robustness
to packet loss, the possibility to send messages at irregular times, imme-
diate message authentication and authentication of unbounded number of
messages.
The study of related work on broadcast authentication in sensor net-
works shows that none of the previously developed protocols satisfies all
these requirements. Thus, the next goal of this thesis is the development of
a broadcast authentication protocol that satisfies all or most of the require-
ments.
Chapter 5: t-Robust Access Control in WSNs. We firstly look into
development of novel access control solutions under the assumption that
the adversary can compromise t or less sensor nodes. This restriction on
the adversary seems to be justified at first glance, as the node compromise
incurs some cost, and therefore, the adversary has to stop sometime, because
otherwise it might be cheaper deploy adversary’s own sensor network in order
to get the required data.
The developed tree-based interleaved authenticated querying scheme has
some advantages. It is fully secure as long as not more than t nodes are
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compromised, and it satisfies some of the above requirements on broad-
cast authentication. The scheme does not require time synchronization, can
authenticate messages sent at irregular time, provides immediate message
authentication and can authenticate an unbounded number of messages. It
also exhibits low computation and communication overhead for small values
of t, such as t = 3. We also show how to utilize the tree-based scheme for
access control.
However, the developed scheme also has some disadvantages. It depends
on the stability of the network topology as it works along a shortest-path
spanning tree of the network, it does not tolerate message loss, and, more im-
portantly, its communication cost gets prohibitively high already for t = 10.
Moreover, the threshold adversary model has a serious drawback, as it
is difficult to justify the choice of t. Why should not the adversary be able
to capture 4 nodes if it has already captured 3 nodes? In general, we think
that the threshold adversary model that was very popular in traditional
distributed systems (see e.g. Byzantine Agreement [92]), does not apply
to the sensor networks due to their large size and unattended operation of
small nodes that are relatively easy to capture.
Nevertheless, developed schemes can be used for sensor networks where
node compromise is considered an unlikely event, and thus t can be set to a
small value.
Chapter 6: Gracefully Degrading Access Control in WSNs. As the
threshold adversary can not be applied to all types of sensor networks, we
turn our attention to gracefully degrading protocols. Their security degrades
with the increasing strength of the adversary. That is, there is no distinct
threshold on the number of captured nodes, but the ability of the protocols to
reach their security goals decreases with the increasing number of captured
nodes.
We develop two probabilistic protocol for broadcast authentication: bAQF
(basic Authenticated Query Flooding) that works with ID-based random
key predistribution [158], and sAQF (simple Authenticated Query Flooding)
that uses its own key predistribution method. Both protocols add proba-
bilistically verifiable authenticators to broadcast messages. Each node can
efficiently verify a legitimate authenticator. However, the nodes can also
fail to recognize a fake authenticator with some small probability. There-
fore, some nodes forward the fake query to their neighbors. This process
is called flooding. However, if the probability of forwarding a fake query is
sufficiently small, the fake query will only travel into the network along a
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short path, as any node that recognizes it as a fake will drop the query.
The probability for the adversary to successfully fake an authenticator
depends on the number of nodes captured by the adversary and on the
authenticator size. Moreover, as long as the adversary did not capture too
many nodes, the security of the scheme degrades gracefully. For example,
sAQF can restrict the propagation of the fake query using the authenticator
size of 200 bits to less than 5 nodes on average, independently of the network
size, in case the adversary captured around 20 nodes. And even if the
number of captured nodes grows up to 30, the propagation of the fake query
is still limited to less than 10 nodes.
The security of the AQF schemes depends on the network topology. The
schemes work well in sparse networks. Very dense networks where the nodes
have more than 10 neighbors on average, should be organized into a tree
structure with the moderate number of children per node. However, there
is no requirement on particular network topology as long as the networks
have an appropriate density.
To summarize, we develop probabilistic, gracefully degrading broadcast
authentication protocols. These protocols are the first to satisfy all re-
quirements formulated in Chapter 3. They provide low computation and
communication overhead, independence on time synchronization and on net-
work topology, robustness to packet loss, the possibility to send messages
at irregular times, immediate message authentication and authentication of
unbounded number of messages.
The price that one pays for these good properties is probabilistic message
authentication. We argue that probabilistic security is more appropriate for
sensor networks than deterministic approaches.
The validity of this assumption has to be verified. This is one of the most
important areas of future work in security for wireless sensor networks.
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